WORK IN PROGRESS
Self-respect and the Demands of Equality
Abstract. The paper explores the relationship between self-respect and liberal equality through the analysis of their conflicting requirements. This implies two tasks. First, I discuss in detail the Rawlsian account of self-respect in order to clarify the notion as applied in his theory. On the ground prepared by this analysis I go on to take a closer look on the relationship between self-respect and the demands of equality. I argue that we can have two options in this respect. Either we assign priority to one of them or we can regard them as equals, having no overriding demands over each other. However, and this constitutes the second part of my argument, liberal egalitarians such as Rawls or Dworkin cannot make the latter step exactly because of their equality-centered conceptions.
Virtue, Silencing, and Desires
Abstract. John McDowell has famously argued that the virtuous person is one who does not face non-virtuous temptations: whenever such desires would power against the virtuous course of action, they are silenced by motives that back what virtue requires. The paper takes this as a challenge to the Humean theory of motivation and sets out to answer it. In doing so, the paper puts forward three possible responses: the first advocates the idea that non-virtuous desires are eradicated in a cognitive process of virtuous reflection; the second holds that given rationality, such non-virtuous desires the virtuous person should not have (and will not have, if rational) in the relevant situations; the third re-describes the alleged conflict as instead one of a discovery process of desires.
Demands, Anticipated Emotions, and Moral Decision-Making (with Martin Bruder and Joseph Sweetman)
Abstract. The paper argues, based on data from experiments (both surveys and experimental games), that anticipated moral emotions (guilt, same, blame, anger) play diverse roles in moral decision-making. As moral demands increase, the relevant anticipated emotional responses change – their intensity decreases - accordingly. At the same time, the structure of this response shows interesting patterns. In particular, the agent’s own anticipated moral emotions (e.g. guilt) are more sensitive to certain kinds of moral demands, namely those that we call subjective; whereas, anticipated moral emotions of others (e.g. blame) are more sensitive to another type of moral demands that we call objective.
The Role of Reasons in Rationing
Abstract. The paper has three parts. In the first part, the aim is to clarify the conceptual landscape of rationing. This consists in delineating the concept, aim and scope of rationing in health care. Thus the paper contrasts the ethical question of rationing with the question whether the state has an obligation to provide its citizens with health care resources. Unlike the latter question, rationing offers an ethical challenge also in exclusively private health care systems. The next issue is what exactly we ration. The paper here argues for its relatively narrow focus: it does not discuss rationing in the wider context of what competing state services require, nor is it interested in the so-called social determinants of health. The focus is on the macro-allocation (as opposed to micro-allocation) of health care resources only. In the second part, the paper introduces and briefly analyses the most influential theories of this form of rationing: the focus is on the utilitarian, communitarian, egalitarian approaches and on fair democratic procedures. Finally, in the third part, the paper puts forward a novel approach to rationing that is reason-based. The idea is to allocate according to the balance of reasons supporting demands for health-care resources. What becomes crucial here, the paper argues, is which theory of reason one makes use of. Since there are roughly two camps in this field – reasons are either desire-based or value-based – the primary challenge of this approach is to work out the implications of these two theories for the rationing of health-care resources.
Abstract. The paper explores the relationship between self-respect and liberal equality through the analysis of their conflicting requirements. This implies two tasks. First, I discuss in detail the Rawlsian account of self-respect in order to clarify the notion as applied in his theory. On the ground prepared by this analysis I go on to take a closer look on the relationship between self-respect and the demands of equality. I argue that we can have two options in this respect. Either we assign priority to one of them or we can regard them as equals, having no overriding demands over each other. However, and this constitutes the second part of my argument, liberal egalitarians such as Rawls or Dworkin cannot make the latter step exactly because of their equality-centered conceptions.
Virtue, Silencing, and Desires
Abstract. John McDowell has famously argued that the virtuous person is one who does not face non-virtuous temptations: whenever such desires would power against the virtuous course of action, they are silenced by motives that back what virtue requires. The paper takes this as a challenge to the Humean theory of motivation and sets out to answer it. In doing so, the paper puts forward three possible responses: the first advocates the idea that non-virtuous desires are eradicated in a cognitive process of virtuous reflection; the second holds that given rationality, such non-virtuous desires the virtuous person should not have (and will not have, if rational) in the relevant situations; the third re-describes the alleged conflict as instead one of a discovery process of desires.
Demands, Anticipated Emotions, and Moral Decision-Making (with Martin Bruder and Joseph Sweetman)
Abstract. The paper argues, based on data from experiments (both surveys and experimental games), that anticipated moral emotions (guilt, same, blame, anger) play diverse roles in moral decision-making. As moral demands increase, the relevant anticipated emotional responses change – their intensity decreases - accordingly. At the same time, the structure of this response shows interesting patterns. In particular, the agent’s own anticipated moral emotions (e.g. guilt) are more sensitive to certain kinds of moral demands, namely those that we call subjective; whereas, anticipated moral emotions of others (e.g. blame) are more sensitive to another type of moral demands that we call objective.
The Role of Reasons in Rationing
Abstract. The paper has three parts. In the first part, the aim is to clarify the conceptual landscape of rationing. This consists in delineating the concept, aim and scope of rationing in health care. Thus the paper contrasts the ethical question of rationing with the question whether the state has an obligation to provide its citizens with health care resources. Unlike the latter question, rationing offers an ethical challenge also in exclusively private health care systems. The next issue is what exactly we ration. The paper here argues for its relatively narrow focus: it does not discuss rationing in the wider context of what competing state services require, nor is it interested in the so-called social determinants of health. The focus is on the macro-allocation (as opposed to micro-allocation) of health care resources only. In the second part, the paper introduces and briefly analyses the most influential theories of this form of rationing: the focus is on the utilitarian, communitarian, egalitarian approaches and on fair democratic procedures. Finally, in the third part, the paper puts forward a novel approach to rationing that is reason-based. The idea is to allocate according to the balance of reasons supporting demands for health-care resources. What becomes crucial here, the paper argues, is which theory of reason one makes use of. Since there are roughly two camps in this field – reasons are either desire-based or value-based – the primary challenge of this approach is to work out the implications of these two theories for the rationing of health-care resources.
