Reasons and Beliefs, with Matteo Morganti, Journal of Philosophical Research 44: 179-196, 2019
Circularity, Naturalism and Desire-Based Reasons, Res Philosophica 94 (4): 1-21, 2017
Can Reasons Be Propositions?, with Matteo Morganti, Theoria 83 (3): 185-205, 2017
Norm-expressivism and Regress, South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3): 362-376, 2017
Pure Cognitivism and Beyond’, Acta Analytica 29 (3): 331-348, 2014
Silencing Desires?, Philosophia, 41 (3): 887-903, 2013
Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking’, Philosophical Studies 152 (2): 209-227, 2011
Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14: 101-115, 2011
Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 6 (2): 67-89, 2010
Desire-based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons from Moore and Parfit, Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 87-107, 2009
The Desire-based Reasons Model, Naturalism and Tolerable Revisionism: Lessons from Moore and Parfit’ In Mario Šilar & Felipe Schwember Augier (eds.), Racionalidad práctica. Intencionalidad, normatividad y reflexividad / Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity, special issue of Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico (Serv. Publicaciones Univ. de Navara), 212: 49-57, 2009
Naturalism and Triviality, Philosophical Writings, 32: 12-30, 2006
Circularity, Naturalism and Desire-Based Reasons, Res Philosophica 94 (4): 1-21, 2017
Can Reasons Be Propositions?, with Matteo Morganti, Theoria 83 (3): 185-205, 2017
Norm-expressivism and Regress, South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3): 362-376, 2017
Pure Cognitivism and Beyond’, Acta Analytica 29 (3): 331-348, 2014
Silencing Desires?, Philosophia, 41 (3): 887-903, 2013
Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking’, Philosophical Studies 152 (2): 209-227, 2011
Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14: 101-115, 2011
Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 6 (2): 67-89, 2010
Desire-based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons from Moore and Parfit, Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 87-107, 2009
The Desire-based Reasons Model, Naturalism and Tolerable Revisionism: Lessons from Moore and Parfit’ In Mario Šilar & Felipe Schwember Augier (eds.), Racionalidad práctica. Intencionalidad, normatividad y reflexividad / Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity, special issue of Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico (Serv. Publicaciones Univ. de Navara), 212: 49-57, 2009
Naturalism and Triviality, Philosophical Writings, 32: 12-30, 2006