DRAFTS
Reasons and Beliefs (with Matteo Morganti)
Abstract. The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. In particular, the challenge has been taken to affect the particular ontological conception of practical reasons that has been defended by Jonathan Dancy. The problem is that Dancy seems forced to maintain both a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and b) that the view according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is outlandish. The suggestion is put forward that, by distinguishing the content of a belief (as a proposition) from its object (as a state of affairs), the conflict between a) and b) can be neutralised. Since our proposal assumes only the basics of Dancy’s theory of reasons, it is available to all those theorists who share his conviction that practical reasons are states of affairs and are ready to embrace the object/content distinction.
Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions (with Andras Miklos)
Abstract. It isn’t saying much to claim that morality is demanding; the question, rather, is: can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection – we call it the demandingness objection – as a given. Our question, therefore, is how to respond to the objection. We put forward a response that we think has not received sufficient attention in the literature: institutional consequentialism. This is a consequentialist view that, however, requires institutions, and not individuals, to follow the consequentialist principle. We first introduce the objection, then explain what we understand under institutional consequentialism and how it responds to the objection. In the remainder of the paper, we defend the view against potential objections
A globalizáció nyomában (with Eric Brown)
Abstract. The aim of the paper is to study the pre-history of the concept of globalization in political philosophy. In doing so, the paper examines the development of two intertwined concepts, those of universalism and cosmopolitanism. The application of these two concepts has been much influenced by the socio-economical situation of the relevant societies; hence the paper aims to place their discussion in this context. Accordingly, the first part of the paper deals with the idea of universalism in classical Greek and stoic philosophy, in renaissance humanism and in the early-modern period. The second part of the paper adds to this the discussion of cosmopolitanism in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy.
On The Road to Meaning
Abstract. The paper offers a philosophically infused analysis of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. The main idea is that McCarthy’s novel is primarily a statement on the meaning of life. Once this idea is argued for and endorsed, by using a parallel between The Road and a 19th century Hungarian dramatic poem, The Tragedy of Man, the paper goes on to argue that the most plausible – although admittedly not the only possible – interpretation of The Road is that it advocates a religious account of the meaning of life that is able to accommodate all other possible interpretations of how the question of meaning figures in the novel.
What Are Basic Liberties? (with Stephen McLeod)
Abstract. Two moral powers are central to Rawls’s account of justice: the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. The fundamental case in which the first capacity is exercised is in ‘the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure and its social policies’. The fundamental case in which the second capacity is exercised is in ‘forming, revising, and rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete life’. Rawls defines as basic those liberties that are necessary to the provision of the social conditions essential for the full and informed exercise of the moral powers in the two fundamental cases. We argue that while necessity is too strong a modal relationship to feature in the definition of the basic liberties, another modal relationship that features in Rawls’s wider discussion of the basic liberties, namely enabling, is too weak. We discuss a new approach to defining the Rawlsian basic liberties in which probability takes over the role previously occupied by modality. However, on this approach some particular freedoms rightly regarded by Rawls as basic liberties do not meet the definition. We conclude that the end relative to which Rawls defines the basic liberties is too narrow. In order to widen it, we appeal to the liberal principle of legitimacy that underlies Rawls’s principles of justice. We explain some implications of this proposal for a broadly Rawlsian theory of justice and current debates about which rights and liberties are genuinely basic.
Consequentialist Demands, Intuitions, and Experimental Methodology (with Joseph Sweetman)
Abstract. It isn’t saying much to claim that morality is demanding; the question, rather, is: can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given and are also not concerned, primarily, in finding the best response to the objection. Instead, our main theoretical aim is to spell out the intuitive background of the objection and to see how this background could be investigated. This double aim leads to different albeit connected threads of inquiry. We first outline the objection, its different forms and how intuition figures in them. After this, we move on to consider the ongoing debate about the use of intuitions in (moral) philosophy with a focus on two challenges: what intuitions are and how we can find them. To answer these challenges, we propose an account according to which moral intuitions are quasi-perceptual seemings that are constituted by moral emotions. Armed with this account, we put forward a novel experimental methodology based, in part, on affective science research and offer some corresponding (specific) experimental designs to illustrate the proposed approach. The idea is that this methodology could then be used to investigate the intuitive grounding of the Objection more effectively than before.
Abstract. The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. In particular, the challenge has been taken to affect the particular ontological conception of practical reasons that has been defended by Jonathan Dancy. The problem is that Dancy seems forced to maintain both a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and b) that the view according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is outlandish. The suggestion is put forward that, by distinguishing the content of a belief (as a proposition) from its object (as a state of affairs), the conflict between a) and b) can be neutralised. Since our proposal assumes only the basics of Dancy’s theory of reasons, it is available to all those theorists who share his conviction that practical reasons are states of affairs and are ready to embrace the object/content distinction.
Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions (with Andras Miklos)
Abstract. It isn’t saying much to claim that morality is demanding; the question, rather, is: can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection – we call it the demandingness objection – as a given. Our question, therefore, is how to respond to the objection. We put forward a response that we think has not received sufficient attention in the literature: institutional consequentialism. This is a consequentialist view that, however, requires institutions, and not individuals, to follow the consequentialist principle. We first introduce the objection, then explain what we understand under institutional consequentialism and how it responds to the objection. In the remainder of the paper, we defend the view against potential objections
A globalizáció nyomában (with Eric Brown)
Abstract. The aim of the paper is to study the pre-history of the concept of globalization in political philosophy. In doing so, the paper examines the development of two intertwined concepts, those of universalism and cosmopolitanism. The application of these two concepts has been much influenced by the socio-economical situation of the relevant societies; hence the paper aims to place their discussion in this context. Accordingly, the first part of the paper deals with the idea of universalism in classical Greek and stoic philosophy, in renaissance humanism and in the early-modern period. The second part of the paper adds to this the discussion of cosmopolitanism in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy.
On The Road to Meaning
Abstract. The paper offers a philosophically infused analysis of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. The main idea is that McCarthy’s novel is primarily a statement on the meaning of life. Once this idea is argued for and endorsed, by using a parallel between The Road and a 19th century Hungarian dramatic poem, The Tragedy of Man, the paper goes on to argue that the most plausible – although admittedly not the only possible – interpretation of The Road is that it advocates a religious account of the meaning of life that is able to accommodate all other possible interpretations of how the question of meaning figures in the novel.
What Are Basic Liberties? (with Stephen McLeod)
Abstract. Two moral powers are central to Rawls’s account of justice: the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. The fundamental case in which the first capacity is exercised is in ‘the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure and its social policies’. The fundamental case in which the second capacity is exercised is in ‘forming, revising, and rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete life’. Rawls defines as basic those liberties that are necessary to the provision of the social conditions essential for the full and informed exercise of the moral powers in the two fundamental cases. We argue that while necessity is too strong a modal relationship to feature in the definition of the basic liberties, another modal relationship that features in Rawls’s wider discussion of the basic liberties, namely enabling, is too weak. We discuss a new approach to defining the Rawlsian basic liberties in which probability takes over the role previously occupied by modality. However, on this approach some particular freedoms rightly regarded by Rawls as basic liberties do not meet the definition. We conclude that the end relative to which Rawls defines the basic liberties is too narrow. In order to widen it, we appeal to the liberal principle of legitimacy that underlies Rawls’s principles of justice. We explain some implications of this proposal for a broadly Rawlsian theory of justice and current debates about which rights and liberties are genuinely basic.
Consequentialist Demands, Intuitions, and Experimental Methodology (with Joseph Sweetman)
Abstract. It isn’t saying much to claim that morality is demanding; the question, rather, is: can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given and are also not concerned, primarily, in finding the best response to the objection. Instead, our main theoretical aim is to spell out the intuitive background of the objection and to see how this background could be investigated. This double aim leads to different albeit connected threads of inquiry. We first outline the objection, its different forms and how intuition figures in them. After this, we move on to consider the ongoing debate about the use of intuitions in (moral) philosophy with a focus on two challenges: what intuitions are and how we can find them. To answer these challenges, we propose an account according to which moral intuitions are quasi-perceptual seemings that are constituted by moral emotions. Armed with this account, we put forward a novel experimental methodology based, in part, on affective science research and offer some corresponding (specific) experimental designs to illustrate the proposed approach. The idea is that this methodology could then be used to investigate the intuitive grounding of the Objection more effectively than before.
