



## Living Well and Living Right

Workshop hosted by the PROFOUND research project at CAS  
The Turret Room  
Centre for Advanced Studies (CAS)  
Drammensveien 78, Oslo

People often seem to experience some sort of conflict between doing what is morally right and doing what is in their own self-interest. Philosophically, we can respond to this phenomenon in several ways. One of them is to describe a structure of normativity where morality and prudence provide us with separate categories of reasons that can come into conflict, raising the question of what we then ought to do all things considered. Another option is to relegate the experience of conflict to appearances only, by arguing that on a proper understanding of reasons, there is no conflict.

This workshop explores the nature of morality, prudence, and the relationship of these to the human good, reasons, and well-being.

## Program, Tuesday May 21

11:30 – 12:45 Lunch (at Hotel Gabelshus)

13.00 – 14.15 Alfred Archer

*You Have to Do It But If You Don't Want To That's Ok: A New Objection To the Sacrifice View of Supererogation*

(Short comfort break)

14.15 – 15.30 Paul Bloomfield

*Self-Respect is the Reward of Morality*

15.30 – 15.45 Coffee Break

15.45 – 17.00 Sophie Grace Chappell

*Is there a Moral/Prudential Distinction?*

18.30 Dinner (venue TBA)

## Program, Wednesday May 22

09:30 – 10:45 Joshua Gert

*Neopragmatism and the Normative Jigsaw*

(Short comfort break)

10:45 – 12:00 David Sobel

*The Ineliminability of a Normative Role for Arbitrary Attitudes*

12:00 – 12:30 Walk to Sæterhytten on Bygdøy

12.30 – 13.00 Aperitif at Sæterhytten

13.00 Lunch at Sæterhytten

## Book of Abstracts

### **Alfred Archer**

*You Have to Do It But If You Don't Want To That's Ok: A New Objection To the Sacrifice View of Supererogation*

A widely accepted feature of our moral lives is that there are some acts that are supererogatory. These are acts that are morally valuable, indeed more valuable than other permissible alternatives, but that are morally optional as they go beyond our moral requirements. The existence of such acts gives rise to a puzzle. If it is possible for acts to be morally better than the acts we are morally required to perform, then what is the connection between moral value and moral requirements? According to a response to this puzzle, which I will call The Sacrifice View, it is the level of sacrifice involved for the agent that prevents acts of supererogation from being morally required. In this paper, I will raise a new objection to this view. I will argue that this view is committed to the existence of acts that are morally obligatory but would not be morally obligatory if the agent had different preferences. I will explain why this should be viewed as a problem for an account of moral obligations and consider how a defender of the Sacrifice View might respond to this objection

### **Paul Bloomfield**

*Self-Respect is the Reward of Morality*

While most see morality is a purely social phenomenon, this misses the necessary self-regarding aspects of morality. How we treat others does not swing free from how we treat ourselves. I argue that immorality is self-disrespecting, and that self-respect is necessary for happiness. The conclusion is that only moral people can live happily.

### **Sophie Grace Chappell**

*Is there a moral/ prudential distinction?*

Short Abstract: No

Longer Abstract: In this talk, my negative thesis is that there is no single clear exclusive and exhaustive distinction between "the moral" and "the prudential". My positive thesis that there are a whole variety of different distinctions in the area, no two of which are co-extensional or anything like it, and that while this variety may make moral systematising difficult or impossible, it is essential to recognise it and respect it if our aim is a philosophical normative ethics that is properly in touch with the realities of ethical experience.

## **Joshua Gert**

"Neopragmatism and the Normative Jigsaw".

In 'Motive Utilitarianism', Robert Adams pointed out that, for a utilitarian, there is a question about the proper level of focus. It is simply not possible to have the optimific motives and also always perform the optimific acts. So a utilitarian cannot have it all, in the sense of having it be possible for a single agent be optimific in all respects. On the the other hand, I myself have argued that any morally required act will be consistent with rationality. In this paper, I apply a neopragmatist perspective to related sets of normative assessments, with attention to the fit, or lack of fit, that we might expect between them.

## **David Sobel**

The Ineliminability of a Normative Role for Arbitrary Attitudes (with Steven Wall)

We have argued elsewhere that views are subjective to the extent that they grant a normative role to attitudes independently of whether those attitudes are warranted by their object. Assuming such a picture, there are two main ways to deny the existence of subjective value. First, one might claim that the attitudes are, quite generally, never directly normatively relevant to prudential value. A difficulty for such an approach is how to capture the prudential value involved in "matters of mere taste." The second path, we think, is more promising. One might allow a direct normative role for the attitudes in determining a person's good, but restrict this role to attitudes that are warranted by their object. That is, one might adopt an "Enjoying the Good" view.

Such views insist that for an option to benefit one it must be good, and good in a way that is not determined by the attitudes but normative for the attitudes. This avoids arbitrariness--the greatest threat to subjective views. Attitudes that are not responsive to genuine values, and therefore arbitrary, lack normative upshot. But beneficial options must also be valued--the agent must have a psychologically contingent favoring attitude toward the option--for it to benefit. This avoids alienation--the greatest threat to objective views.

This paper explores "valuing the good" approaches. We will try to show why such theories cannot convincingly eliminate a genuinely subjective component in theories of well-being.