

Too Much of a Good Thing? An Experimental Inquiry Into the Intuitive Basis of the Overdemandingness Objection to Consequentialism

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1 State of the art and preliminary work

1.1 Consequentialism and the Overdemandingness Objection

Consequentialism holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind, as judged from an impersonal perspective. The paradigm case of consequentialism is utilitarianism, whose classic proponents were Jeremy Bentham (1789/1961), John Stuart Mill (1861/1998), and Henry Sidgwick (1907). These classic utilitarians were all *act-consequentialist*: They held that whether an act is morally right or wrong depends only on its consequences (as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act or anything that happens before the act or anything that relates to the act). They were *utilitarians* because they advocated consequentialism with a welfarist theory of value, that is, a theory that focuses on welfare, well-being, or happiness as the relevant consequence. And since they understood happiness in terms of the balance of the amount of pleasure over pain, they were also *hedonists*. In this research project I start from an objection that has originally targeted classic utilitarians, but can be employed against any form of act-consequentialism (from now on 'consequentialism', unless qualified).

Let me call this charge the **Overdemandingness Objection** or OD (cf. Williams, 1973; Wolf, 1982; Sidgwick, 1907; Mackie, 1977; cf. Wessels, 2002). OD is built upon two pillars: first, that consequentialism is extremely demanding and, second, that an adequate morality cannot be extremely demanding. Consequentialism requires the agent to promote the good until the point where further efforts would burden the agent as much as they would benefit others. However, the situation that determines what would be best overall is far from ideal: Today's world involves, for example, significant levels of poverty; the levels of charitable donations are insufficient to eradicate this poverty; and the institutions that might make things better are not effective, neither domestically nor internationally. Given that acting to alleviate poverty is likely to have, in sum, more positive consequences than pursuing individual goals and projects, it seems unavoidable that, if one fully accepts consequentialism, one must devote most of one's resources to humanitarian work or to the support of institutions that carry out this work. At the same time, so OD assumes, most people have a firmly held intuition that this cannot be right, that people should not be required to sacrifice their lives on the altar of morality. This is the second pillar of the objection. If this intuition indeed exists, it grounds a constraint on admissible moral theories, which requires them to avoid unacceptable demands. If they do not, the conclusion follows that these theories should not be allowed to guide people's conduct. OD is an attempt to articulate this constraint.

Any proper investigation into this problematic must take as its starting point the most plausible form of OD. As I have argued in detail elsewhere (Tanyi, 2012), those who advocate OD should follow what might be called the *authority* dimension of moral demands. That is, their claim should be that consequentialism is overdemanding because, while being stringent in content and pervasive in scope, our reasons to meet its requirements override other competing reasons, resulting in situations where it demands of us, with decisive force, that we do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to do. If one wants to respond to OD, therefore, one must take this to be the right interpretation of what the Objection states, and then deny it in some way.

This can be put more formally in the following argument: (1) consequentialism makes demand D; (2) demand D is intuitively unreasonable; therefore, (3) consequentialism makes intuitively unreasonable demands; (4) if a moral theory makes intuitively unreasonable demands, then we have reason to reject it; therefore, (5) we have reason to reject consequentialism. This more detailed structure illustrates the possible ways of responding to OD. Of these, the following two responses figure most frequently in the literature. The *strategy of denial* rejects premise (1) either because it holds that the premise rests on false empirical facts (for a thorough discussion and criticism see

Mulgan, 2001) or because it aims to restructure consequentialism in such a way that it no longer makes the demand. The latter approach has given rise to such positions as sub-maximizing consequentialism (Slote, 1984; for criticism see Pettit, 1984), two-level consequentialism (Hare, 1981; and in general the distinction between decision procedure and criterion of rightness in Railton, 1984; for criticism see McNaughton, 1988), rule-consequentialism (most recently Hooker, 2000; for criticism see Mulgan, 2001), limited consequentialism (Scheffler, 1992, 1994; for criticism see Kagan, 1984), cooperative consequentialism (Murphy, 2000; for criticism see Mulgan, 2001), and combined consequentialism (Mulgan, 2001). Taking an entirely different stance, the *strategy of extremism* does not deny that consequentialism makes high demands; what it denies is that these high demands are objectionable: that is, it rejects premise (4). It does so by undermining or discrediting the intuition that premise (2) refers to. Thus it is argued that this intuition rests on lack of information, lack of clear thinking, lack of imaginative empathy or on some psychological 'failure', or that it tracks something entirely different from issues of excessive demands (Kagan, 1989; Singer, 1972; Tännsjö, 2002; Unger, 1996; Sobel, 2007; for criticism of some of these ideas see Cullity, 1994, 2004; Mulgan 2001).

All these approaches, however, have their – much discussed - problems; it would therefore bring fresh impetus to the discussion if one approached the problematic from a different angle. Since premises (1) and (4) have already received thorough attention, the only remaining crucial step in the argument of OD is premise (2). Since this premise is empirical, making claims about an intuition people allegedly share, the corresponding discussion should also be, at least in part, empirical in nature. Such discussion would therefore be an instance of the emerging field of **experimental philosophy**. Experimental philosophy pursues traditional questions of philosophy, but uses, among others, the tools of contemporary psychology to examine people's intuitions about e.g., moral problems. Evidently, for this enterprise to be meaningful, intuitions must play a critical role in the relevant philosophical argument. However, this is not a universally held position among philosophers.

1.2 The debate about intuitions

Why is it so crucial that OD is based on an *intuition* rather than merely an opinion? Intuitions matter for a philosopher because they are taken to have **evidential value** (Lynch, 2006; Sosa, 2006). Like observations in science, intuitions are the raw data that competing moral theories should at least try to accommodate: If an intuition counts in favour of a theory, this is good for the theory; if an intuition counts against a theory, this is bad for the theory. All this goes only *prima facie*, of course. There can be grounds to discount intuitions, or even not to take them into consideration; the strategy of extremism above does just this. It is also possible that, on balance and compared to other theories, a moral theory turns out to be the best available even though it has counterintuitive implications. Nevertheless, intuitions have initial credibility for (most) philosophers; this is why, unlike in (moral) psychology where the study of intuitions has seen a revival only in the last 25 years (see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, for a review), intuitions have always been important in philosophy.

However, there is a range of dissenting voices. Among the many criticisms of the idea that intuitions can be used as evidence (for a good overview of different attempts not mentioned here see Appiah, 2008; Doris & Stich, 2005; for relevant research in psychology demonstrating variation in intuitions across situations, individuals, and cultures, see Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Nichols & Ulatowski, 2007; Banerjee, Huebner, & Hauser, 2011), two are directly relevant for conducting experimental research in philosophy. The first concerns the question of **what intuitions are**; the problem being that in the absence of a proper characterization intuitions appear to be strange, *a priori*, Platonic entities that philosophers, especially those with naturalistic inclinations, have trouble accepting (for recent contributions to this debate see Goldman, 2007; Hales, 2000; Hintikka, 1999). The second objection to using intuitions as evidence is more epistemological. The idea is that given what intuitions are (that is, given an answer to the first problem), there are insurmountable problems concerning their empirical investigation. In other words, the challenge is **how to find intuitions**, even if we know what they are (see e.g., Kauppinen, 2007; Podsakoff et al., 2003).

1.3 The present contribution: a nutshell summary

As argued in Section 1.1, the best interpretation of OD is based on the authority dimension of moral demands and claims that consequentialism is unreasonably demanding. To assess the truth of OD understood in this way, the present research pursues an approach that has so far not figured in the literature. Using empirical studies, it aims to investigate the empirical premise that underlies OD in what is arguably its strongest reading: that at least some consequentialist demands are unreasonably extreme, according to people's own intuitive assessment of the relevant situations. As noted in Section 1.2, a particular challenge that I will have to meet in this enterprise concerns the ontology (what

intuitions are) and epistemology of intuitions (how to find them). Drawing on current philosophical and psychological research I will first give an account of intuitions as cognitive states with three defining characteristics: immediacy, lack of inference, and stability. Then, in an effort to meet the above-described epistemological challenge, using certain methodological innovations, I will propose empirical studies addressing all three characteristics of intuitions. Testing the second characteristic will also involve research on emotions: Appealing to cognitive theories of emotion that propose an intimate relation between intuitions and emotions, I will partly rely on assessing people's emotional responses to morally challenging situation. I spell out this empirical approach to OD, the relevant objectives and methods, as well as the prospective schedule of the research project in Section 2.

1.4 Preliminary work

This investigation continues my research in the field of reasons for action and builds on a collaborative research project with Dr. Martin Bruder, a social psychologist who was my colleague at the Zukunftskolleg of the University of Konstanz. This joint pilot project on the empirical premise of OD was supported by Zukunftskolleg Interdisciplinary Project Grants totaling € 19,393 and has resulted in three co-authored manuscripts. One is currently revised for a resubmission to *Utilitas*; another was invited into a special issue of *The Journal of Value Inquiry* (guest editors: Sabine Roeser, Joel Rickard), whereas a third article that grew out of the research is planned to be part of a volume (editors: Christoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch, Matthias Uhl) on experimental philosophy that is presently in the revise and resubmit stage with Palgrave Macmillan. Results of the project have also been presented at several conferences and workshops in, among others, the Hague, London, Konstanz, and Lucca (Italy). The last talk about the project took place in the Research Forum of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bayreuth, where I serve as an Interim Professor (W3 Vertretung, successor of Prof. Dr. Rainer Hegselmann) in this academic year.

Pilot project

Given its importance for the present application, I will briefly summarize the main findings of the first two studies of the collaborative pilot project (these are the ones that are reported in the first manuscript mentioned above). In these studies, we tested the proposition that there exists a widely shared intuition that at least some consequentialist demands are unreasonably extreme. Based on the philosophical literature discussing OD, the main expectations were that (a) **Hypothesis 1**: increasing demands would be associated with higher levels of rejection of the consequentialist course of action and (b) **Hypothesis 2**: at least in some cases the consequentialist course of action would be perceived as overly demanding by most if not all participants.

We were also interested in identifying the characteristics of those demands that would potentially lead to increased rejection of the consequentialist course of action. As a first step in that direction, the studies separately manipulated demands that could be called *objective demands*, on the one hand, and *subjective demands*, on the other. The term objective demands is meant to imply that following the consequentialist course of action has an actual material effect on the outcomes of the agent. That is, behaving in a consequentialist manner may either be relatively expensive or resource-intensive (high objective demands) or relatively inexpensive or not resource intensive (low objective demands). Subjective demands, in contrast are the personal value an individual attaches to a specific action. In other words, individuals have idiosyncratic preferences and a consequentialist course of action (even if it is objectively the same action) may be perceived by some individuals as relatively more pleasant (low subjective demands) whereas others may perceive it as relatively more unpleasant (high subjective demands).

Study 1

Participants ($N = 143$) read four fictitious scenarios. In one scenario, they were, for example, asked to imagine that they had been invited to start work as a civil engineer building an orphanage in Africa. However, just before departing for Africa, someone offered them an alternative position. Given the specific circumstances of the aid project, taking up the alternative offer would mean that the orphanage would not be built and a large number of children would suffer from lack of shelter. The nature of the alternative job offer varied: It was either objectively attractive (i.e., very lucrative; high objective demands) or not (low objective demands) and either subjectively appealing (i.e., the position one had always dreamed of; high subjective demands) or not (low subjective demands). We hypothesized that both increasing objective and subjective demands would lead to higher levels of dissent with consequentialism as indicated by the answer to the question "Overall, what is the thing to do in this situation?" (*take the alternative job vs. go to Africa*). Indeed, across the four scenarios,

participants were more likely to opt against the consequentialist option when objective demands were high rather than low, $F(1, 136) = 13.88, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .093$, and when subjective demands were high rather than low, $F(1, 136) = 9.95, p = .002, \eta^2_p = .068$. Therefore, the results bore out the first hypothesis that there is an association between increasing demands and the tendency towards nonconsequentialist decisions. However, although more demanding situations elicited greater dissent with consequentialism, intriguingly, the *absolute level* of that dissent was lower than was expected (according to Hypothesis 2). Even on the highest demand level the percentage numbers of those taking nonconsequentialist decisions was less than 50 % (see Figure 1). Thus, the expectation that the intuition underlying OD is *wide-spread* was **not** confirmed in the present set of scenarios. Although, given the increasing tendency, there might be extreme situations in which Hypothesis 2 *is* confirmed, the question is – given the overall relatively high demands used in the scenarios – how realistic and philosophically relevant such situations would be.




Figure 1. The ratio of nonconsequentialist decisions for high and low material and subjective demands in Study 1. Error bars represent standard errors.




Figure 2. Percentage of endowment (100 EUR) that participants kept for themselves in Study 2. Error bars represent standard errors.

Study 2

Because the “as-if”-character of imaginary scenarios may not elicit the same kind of responses as real-life situations (Parkinson & Manstead, 1993) and because of possible response tendencies towards socially desirable answers (Krosnick, 1999), the aim of Study 2 was to pose a real moral decision that was structurally similar to the fictitious situations of Study 1 under conditions of complete anonymity. In an online study, 357 participants divided a possible lottery win of €100 between themselves and a UNICEF program buying measles vaccines for children in the developing world (for similar paradigms see Aguiar, Branas-Garza, & Miller, 2008; Eckel & Grossman, 1996). Objective demands were manipulated by participants having to either earn their participation in the lottery (high objective demands) or receive it as a windfall reward (low objective demands; see Cherry, Frykblom, & Shogren, 2002). Subjective demands were manipulated by participants either brainstorming about how they could make use of € 100 at the beginning of the study (high subjective demands) or brainstorming about a task-irrelevant issue (low subjective demands). Rewards were actually paid out to one randomly selected participant. The findings again showed (in line with Hypothesis 1) that both objective, $F(1, 353) = 5.33, p = .022, \eta^2_p = .015$, and subjective, $F(1, 353) = 6.49, p = .011, \eta^2_p = .018$, demands increased participants’ tendency to act in a nonconsequentialist manner (i.e., to keep a larger part of the endowment for themselves; see Figure 2). However, the detailed pattern of means shown in Figure 2 again sheds doubt on the viability of Hypothesis 2. Even in the most demanding situation, participants, on average, saw reason to donate more than 40% of the endowment.

Conclusion

In sum, the two pilot studies revealed a pattern of data that may have intriguing implications for the debate on overdemandingness in that, on the one hand, increasing demands decreased people’s endorsement of consequentialism. On the other hand, there were a significant number of people who endorsed consequentialism even in the face of growing demands.

2 Objectives and work programme

2.1 Objectives

The goals of this investigation are threefold. **First**, I aim to empirically examine whether the intuition underlying OD is indeed widely shared. The reported preliminary studies shed doubt on this claim. They suggest that although there is an association between increasing objective and subjective demands on the one hand and the tendency to endorse nonconsequentialist courses of action on the other, the absolute level of dissent with consequentialism – even under relatively high demands – is lower than one would expect. If this empirical finding bore out in further studies and would generalize across assessment tools, samples, and situations, this would pose serious problems to the overdemandingness challenge to consequentialism. This is because OD explicitly relies on the empirical proposition that there exists such a widely shared intuition. Although this suggestion has not been contested in the past, it seems that OD may rest on a problematic assumption. Given the prominence of OD in the moral philosophical debate about consequentialism, it is time to test its empirical foundations.

Second, the conceptual as well as the empirical work proposed here should contribute to the understanding of the role of emotions and intuitions in moral decision-making. Investigating the role of emotions and intuitions in making moral judgments has seen a revival in moral psychology (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Haidt, 2001, 2007) and has long been a standard feature in moral philosophy (for references see Sections 1.2 and 2.4.2). Recent philosophical work has sought to integrate emotions and intuitions into moral philosophy (e.g., Roeser, 2011) on the basis of cognitive theories of emotion. Throughout this program of research, the studies will assess both emotions and intuitions and will thereby contribute to a better empirical grasp on their relationship. The conceptual foundations for these investigations will be firmly based on recent philosophical work in this area (for details see Work Programme below).

Third, and finally, the project aims to contribute to the conceptualization and the methodology of assessing folk intuitions in moral philosophy. Intuitions are of high (albeit often contested) relevance to moral philosophers. Given their status, we believe that it is problematic that in the emerging field of experimental philosophy intuitions are often simply assessed by asking people their opinions. It is well known that such opinions are subject to various response biases including, for example, individuals' tendency to respond in socially desirable ways (e.g. Podsakoff et al., 2003). Thus, what such methodologies reveal may solely be a reflection of what individuals hold to be the dominant or prescribed view in their social environment. In contrast, I suggest that the conceptualization of intuitions should focus on their key characteristics of immediacy, non-inference, and stability and attempt to triangulate the results of different assessment methods. This should render it more likely that robust intuitions rather than mere surface intuitions, or, even worse, socially desired statements are revealed.

2.2 Significance

I believe that the empirical approach of this project will move the discussion forward in some critical aspects in several areas of inquiry. In particular, in addition to contributing to the discussion of the Overdemandingness Objection against consequentialism, I expect to learn more about the authority relations in folk morality as well as about the role of emotions in moral decision-making. I agree with Sosa (2007) that empirical data collection can meaningfully complement careful conceptual analyses. Although philosophers have long been used to interpreting empirical data collected by other sciences, it is a relatively recent development that philosophers collect their own data or enter into interdisciplinary empirical research endeavours **specifically addressing genuinely philosophical questions**.

The project also has practical significance and its results will therefore be relevant outside the specialist domains involved. This significance has three sources. **First**, there is much public discussion about the general role and importance of moral demands in our life. In the public domain, moral requirements are invoked in many political decisions as diverse as, for example, the decision of whether to provide financial help to indebted European countries, the design of a sustainable energy policy (hence, the institution of an *Ethik-Kommission* "Sichere Energieversorgung"), or the level of entitlements available to those in long-term unemployment. **Second**, there is also much public discussion about our obligations towards the poor. Given the enormous level of poverty in the world, there is heated debate about whether one should help, how one should help, how much help one should give, and so on (see, e.g., Peter Singer's website and his initiative "The Life You Can Save"). In all these debates OD plays an important role, implicitly or explicitly. This is not surprising. In our world, the demands of consequentialism, and thus the significance of OD as a response to these demands, are real. Pressing moral questions arise in both the national and the international arenas: answering them makes examination of OD inevitable.

Turning to the other focus point of the project, here, too, the extra-academic relevance is clear. Thus, **third**, understanding the proper role of moral emotions in moral decision-making may help us make better moral decisions (e.g., by avoiding undue reliance on purely cognitive processes). For example, those few who have aided victims of gang crime in German train stations, and in some cases may have saved the victim's life, are usually considered to have performed actions of high moral standing. Such actions are often explained with explicit reference to moral emotions. At the same time, OD is a recurring argument in public discussions of whether providing such help is morally required (and that it may, in fact, not be).

2.3 Work programme incl. proposed research methods

2.3.1 Methods

My approach will partly rely on empirical data collection and I therefore consider it to fall into the area of **experimental philosophy** with strong connections to the psychology of emotions. In my empirical studies I will use fictitious scenarios and experimental games to investigate people's intuitions about the balance of reasons in a conflict between a consequentialist course of action and the pursuit of one's own non-moral projects. I will apply methods from cognitive and social psychology in order to examine whether the intuitions reported by participants qualify as both immediate and stable. I thereby go beyond other research in moral psychology and experimental moral philosophy that often takes people's self-reported intuitions at face value (cf. Carmel, 2011; Nichols, 2011). In the same experiments, I will also test participants' *emotional responses* to the situations, the underlying philosophical thought being that certain moral emotions and moral intuitions are intimately related (for more detail on this idea, see the following section). Using these diverse methods, I aim to ensure that we indeed elicit people's *intuitions*, thereby, at least in part, answering the ontological and epistemological concerns discussed in Section 1.2. In the work programme I provide the theoretical background for the project as well as a short description and schedule of the planned experiments. Detailed descriptions of the planned studies can be found in the enclosed Appendix.

2.3.2 Work programme

The project will involve theoretical work as well as empirical studies addressing specific aspects of the theoretical contribution. The theoretical and empirical elements are therefore closely intertwined and they rely argumentatively on each other. Below I first explain the theoretical foundations, and then I turn to a brief description of the proposed empirical studies.

Theoretical foundations

OD is a good example of the way intuitions are used as evidence in moral theorizing. This objection crucially hinges on the assumed evidential value of moral intuitions in that it claims that people *intuit* that consequentialism is (sometimes) unreasonably demanding and *therefore* certain actions demanded by consequentialism are not *in fact* morally required – hence consequentialism is not the right theory to guide our conduct. This reasoning invites researchers to empirically investigate people's intuitive assessment of reasons for their decisions in experimental situations. Yet, although different moral intuitions have been the topic of substantial empirical research (see, e.g., extensive studies on the clash of utilitarian and deontological demands, Greene et al., 2009; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007), the intuition underlying OD has not yet received any systematic empirical attention. In four studies I will use imaginary scenarios and experimental games that involve the conflict between consequentialist considerations, on the one hand, and non-moral reasons (i.e., personal projects) on the other. I will examine whether increasing the weight of such non-moral reasons evokes the intuition underlying OD – that some consequentialist demands are unreasonably demanding. In this way, I will map a significant section of the moral terrain in terms of its authority relations.

Based on the above reported results of my pilot project with Dr. Martin Bruder, I expect to find that (1) there will be an increasing *tendency* towards nonconsequentialist decisions as demands increase, but that (2) the *absolute* level of dissent with consequentialism will not be such that it is warranted to speak about a *widespread* intuition. In this latter case I expect that the empirical premise of OD will **not** be confirmed.

For this kind of research it is crucial to define what intuitions are and how one can actually learn what intuitions people hold: The (assumed) nature of intuitions determines the particular investigative methods. I will respond to these concerns by following a tripartite characterization of intuitions. The social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2001) emphasizes and elaborates on the first characteristic – *immediacy* – by stating that “intuition occurs quickly, effortlessly, and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is accessible to consciousness” (p. 818). The immediacy of intuitions, however, is only important for philosophers insofar as it increases the likelihood of them being *non-inferential*: The moral judgments upon

which they are based are not accepted on the ground that they follow from some moral theory or principle (Tersman, 2008). This is essential if they are to function as evidence that can, at least *prima facie*, resolve conflict among competing moral theories: they could not support or count against a moral theory were they only to be inferred from that or any other theory. For the same reason, namely to ensure the evidential value of intuitions, philosophers tend to go even beyond the immediacy and non-inferential nature of intuitions. They emphasize a third condition: *stability*. For philosophers this condition matters because it helps to elevate intuitions to the level of considered judgments, or, as they were recently called, *robust intuitions* (as opposed to the immediate reactions of surface intuitions; for the distinction see Kauppinen, 2007). These are those immediate responses of the agent that have, so to speak, withstood the test of reflection: They are those (surface) intuitions that a competent speaker would retain under sufficiently ideal conditions, such as when the speaker is not biased (Sidgwick, 1907; Liao, 2008).

In my research I will use different empirical methods to examine these three characteristics. The **immediacy** of intuitions is a central focus of psychological research on intuitive processes (Glöckner & Witteman, 2010). Much of this research is based on dual-process models of reasoning and social behaviour (e.g., Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Evans, 2008). These models propose a distinction between rational, controlled processes (which, in line with Epstein et al., 1996, I will call *analytical-rational*), on the one hand, and automatic, associative, affect-based processes (which I will call *intuitive-experiential*), on the other. Intuitive-experiential processes are supposed to operate quickly and with low levels of mental effort and conscious awareness. They therefore capture the immediacy characteristic of intuitions. Standard experimental paradigms are available to test the role of intuitive-experiential processes in judgment and decision-making. These include, in particular, placing participants under severe time constraints (Horstmann, Hausmann, & Ryf, 2010) or adding cognitive load (i.e., a second task that has to be completed in parallel to the focal task; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Both methods rely on inhibiting analytical-rational processes. The underlying rationale is that once conscious reasoning is precluded from operating, what is left are intuitive-experiential processes that generate immediate intuitions concerning the object of the judgment.

In terms of experimental methodology, the supposed **non-inferential character** of intuitions is particularly challenging. Although immediacy of reaction in the course of an associative, effortless, and nonconscious (i.e., intuitive-experiential) process renders it unlikely that complex inferences made on the basis of a moral theory occur, the speed of a reaction may not by itself be sufficient to demonstrate the lack of inference. I therefore propose a complementary method to address this challenge.

In recent years *cognitive theories of emotion* have become influential in the philosophy of emotion. In a related development, *cognitive appraisal theories of emotion* have become the dominant family of theories in psychological emotion research (see Moors, 2009, for a review). Both families of theories claim that emotions are mental states that have affective, conative, and cognitive aspects at the same time: they are motivating affective states that involve evaluative representations of their objects (cf. Solomon, 1993; Goldie, 2000, 2007; Slaby & Stephan, 2008; Slaby, Stephan, & Walter 2011). For me it is this latter characteristic that is most important. There are two main interpretations. The more robustly cognitive line has it that the representational intentional content of an emotion is that of a *belief or judgment*, and the phenomenal – which is also the motivating – aspect, is merely added on, without explanation, and without any attempt at synthesis with the emotion's cognitive aspect (e.g., Solomon 1993). The other, less robustly cognitive line has it that emotions purport to be *perceptions* of properties such as being funny, shameful, pitiable, enviable and so forth: their intentional (representational) content is understood by analogy to sense perception. In this way, since perception, arguably, possesses phenomenology, the intentional (representational) and the affective – thus also the motivational – aspects of emotion are not unrelated, as on the first reading; on the contrary, the former is part of the latter. Emotions are, as Sabine Döring calls them, *affective perceptions*: they involve a distinct cognition that is distinct exactly because of its phenomenology. (Döring, 2003; 2007; cf. De Sousa, 1987; Roberts, 1988). This thought gives rise to several important ideas that are directly relevant for my project.

First, if emotions are indeed states akin to perceptions, they can be correct and incorrect, depending how well they track the properties of which they are purportedly representations. It is in this sense that philosophers, as well as non-philosophers, speak of the fittingness of emotions: whether it makes sense to feel an emotion in the given situation. In other words, something like a *rationalism* of emotions is true (de Sousa, 1987; Peacock, 1992). Second, if emotions are analogous to perceptions, then this suggests that, like sense perceptions, their content is not inferentially related to the contents of other states. That is, it is possible for an agent to have an emotion the content of which conflicts with the content of the agent's judgment (belief), without any contradiction being involved. There are thus *no inferential constraints* on emotions, just as there are none on sense perceptions (Döring, 2003; 2007). Third, the non-inferential character of emotions opens up the possibility that “the occurrence of an emotion can, in suitable circumstances, entitle a thinker to judge, and possibly to know, its content simply by taking its representational content at face value. In the case of moral emotions, the possibility emerges that those

emotions may give the thinker a non-inferential way of coming to know moral propositions” (Döring, 2003, p. 229). In fact, going one step further, it could be argued that the content of emotions is *gestalt*-like: coming to know, via the emotion, a moral proposition, is like suddenly coming to see how the dots together form Marilyn Monroe’s face in a pointillist painting. There are no inferential relations between seeing the dots (morally salient features of the situation), and seeing Monroe’s face (moral proposition) (cf. Döring, 2003; Little, 1997; Roeser, 2006; 2011; Hookway, 2002). Finally, depending on one’s views of moral properties, emotions can either be facilitative or constitutive of the process of gaining moral knowledge: in the former case one can, in principle, get to know the moral proposition without the requisite emotion, in the latter case one cannot (cf. D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000).

These ideas are relevant for my project because they suggest that there might be an intimate connection between intuitions and emotions; in fact, some have gone as far as to claim that intuitions *are* emotions: that something like an *affectual intuitionism* is true (Roeser, 2006; 2011). Assuming for now that such an intimate connection exists, it seems that we can begin to address the difficulties surrounding the empirical testability of the non-inferential character of intuitions by focusing on participants’ emotional responses to the situation. Insofar as these responses are in line with participants’ judgments concerning the balance of reasons in the given situation, we may conclude that those judgments are intuitions or at least express the agent’s endorsement of her intuitive, thus non-inferential, responses to the situation. What perhaps would prove to be even more telling is if it turned out that there were no correspondence between participants’ emotional responses and their judgments of reasons. Then we could draw one of the following conclusions. (1) It could be that participants’ judgments were not intuitions; (2) it could be that the participant did not endorse, upon reflection, her original intuition (hence the intuition was not a stable considered judgment); finally, (3), we could give up our idea that intuitions are intimately connected to emotions. Notice, however, that even this latter option could offer us some insight into the relation between intuitions and emotions in our particular context of investigation. For then we could further hypothesize that the relevant negative emotion occurs at a significantly higher demand level than the relevant negative moral judgment does (and *vice versa*). In other words, there may be much less of a problem with the demandingness of consequentialism if one focuses on emotions, than if one focuses on judgments (intuitions).

My investigation at this point, then, will focus on testing with which emotions, how intensively, and for what reasons, participants react to the experimental situations. In this endeavour, I will focus on assessing a number of *moral emotions*, the connections of which to moral properties and judgments are well researched in the literature (see Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007, for a review on psychological research on moral emotions; for utilitarianism and the moral emotions see Fehige & Frank, 2010). Although, in philosophy, moral emotions are typically related to so-called ‘thick’ properties, such as being pitiable, enviable etc., some argue for a strong, even constitutive connection between the ‘thin’ property of wrongness and a moral emotion. Thus, for instance, Allan Gibbard (1990, p. 42) holds that “[w]hat a person does is morally wrong if and only if it is rational for him to feel guilty for doing it, and for others to resent him.” And John Skorupski (2010) analyzes wrongness in terms of blameworthiness, i.e., whether it makes sense to feel blame towards a person. (Neuro)psychological research supports this reasoning. Greene et al. (2001) have shown that there are systematic variations in the engagement of emotion-related brain areas in moral judgments. One emotion that has received substantial empirical attention in moral psychology is disgust. Schnall et al. (2008) demonstrated that disgust can render moral judgments more severe. Focusing on moral emotions may therefore help us to investigate people’s moral intuitions concerning wrongness and rightness in the experimental situations.

Finally, I will attempt to investigate the **strength and stability** of moral intuitions. Similar to research addressing the immediacy of moral intuitions, studies examining their strength and stability will also attempt to elicit spontaneous moral judgments. However, in a second step, these studies will engage conscious, analytical-rational mental processes to further examine whether the spontaneous judgments stand the “test of reflection” and therefore acquire the status of considered judgments.

I believe that my methodological approach to assessing intuitions positively transcends the strong reliance of research in experimental moral philosophy and moral psychology on self-reports of moral judgments. Huebner (2011) has recently argued that such experiments alone cannot establish the intuitive nature (understood primarily in terms of the immediacy characteristic) of moral judgments. Although no single study of mine will achieve this goal either (and it can be doubted whether such a study is even a possibility), I believe that my multi-method approach will increase understanding of the intuitive processes involved in judging the overdemandingness of consequentialist requirements in particular and in making moral judgments more generally. Specifically, I will investigate whether my results remain stable across the different proposed characteristics of moral intuitions. Both stabilities and possible instabilities would prove informative for the central philosophical argument of the project.

Empirical investigations

I will outline our plans for empirical studies only in brief at this point. Methodological details for each study as well as cost estimates, can be found in enclosed Appendix.

I will examine the empirical basis of OD in three closely related lines of research each of which will focus on one of the aforementioned characteristics of intuitions. The studies will be relevant beyond the immediate problematic of OD by helping to pave the way to a more differentiated assessment of intuitions (including the assessment of emotions).

Research Line A will build on my preliminary work with Dr. Bruder and test whether the intuition underlying OD is **immediate**. To this end, I will examine whether moral intuitions are stable across processing modes within a given individual. Participants will respond to scenarios similar to those used in my pilot work. Before they do so, both studies in this research line will manipulate the degree to which individuals engage in analytical-rational versus intuitive-experiential processing and examine the effects of this manipulation on moral judgments. *Study 1* will add time constraints to the task for half of the participants and thereby increase their reliance on more highly automatised (and thus quicker) intuitive processes. *Study 2* will reduce the cognitive capacity available to participants by placing them under cognitive load (i.e., participants have to memorize numbers while working on the task). Although these manipulations are common in psychological decision-making research, applications to the moral judgment domain are rare (for recent exceptions demonstrating the promise of the methodology see Callan, Sutton, & Dovale, 2010; Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Together, these studies will tell me whether the pattern of results observed in my pilot research occurs in an immediate and relatively effortless manner. If it does, this will support the idea that those judgments were made on the basis of intuitions.

Research Line B will draw on cognitive theories of emotion to provide some insight into whether the intuition underlying OD is **non-inferential**. *Study 3* will employ a novel unobtrusive test targeting the nonverbal behaviour associated with moral emotions while participants respond to fictitious moral scenarios. Emotions marking individual moral transgressions – such as shame or some forms of embarrassment – are related to (a) decreased body expansion, (b) averted gaze, and (c) downward head tilt (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). I will make use of the novel tool of automated face and posture video analysis to assess the degree to which participants experience such emotions while making moral judgments. This assessment largely avoids response biases that may influence self-reports of emotion while retaining the ability to make inferences concerning relatively specific emotions (which is often not possible with physiological measures of emotions). Because emotions in response to fictitious scenarios may differ from emotions experienced in real decision situations (Parkinson & Manstead, 1993), *Study 4* aims to investigate whether the intuition underlying OD can also be observed in decisions with real-world consequences. Evidently, these decisions cannot involve equally serious implications as those described in the scenarios. However, economic games provide an established framework to investigate decision making with real monetary outcomes. Although rarely the case, some studies have used such games to explicitly investigate moral decision-making (e.g., Aguiar et al., 2008; Hofmann & Baumert, 2010). Similar to my second preliminary study, participants will distribute an amount of money between themselves and a charitable organisation that alleviates suffering in the developing world (e.g., *UNICEF*). In addition to participants' explicit moral judgments, we will analyse their nonverbal emotional behaviour. If emotions were strong indicators of the intuition underlying OD this would lend increased credibility to the idea that this intuition is indeed non-inferential.

Research Line C will address whether the moral intuition underlying OD is **strong and stable**. To do so, I will use an adapted think-aloud procedure to identify participants' reasoning processes while they are making moral judgments (Van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994). Participants will be trained to continuously verbalise their thoughts while responding to morally challenging scenarios. I will also manipulate whether or not participants are encouraged to reflect in detail on their immediate responses. Thus, some participants will be led to subject their initial responses to a thorough "test of reflection". Whereas – in line with my pilot work – *Study 5* will investigate the clash between consequentialist demands and non-moral considerations, *Study 6* will also involve deontological moral considerations and special concerns for particular people to test whether such additional moral demands impact on the stability of initial reactions. I will thereby be able to map a larger area of the moral terrain in terms of its authority relations. The studies therefore focus on robust intuitions or considered judgments and examine whether the intuition postulated by OD, if found, belongs to this group.

2.3.3 Work schedule

	2014			2015			
	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Conceptual Work							
Research Line A							
Study 1							
Study 2							
Research Line B							
Study 3							
Study 4							
Research Line C							
Study 5							
Study 6							
External Visits							
Prof Dr Sabine Döring							
Prof Dr Sabine Roeser							
Dr Simone Schnall							
Workshops							
International Workshop							
Publications (peer-reviewed)							
Submission of manuscripts							
Conference Presentations							
PI (3 presentations)							
Specific Training Modules							
FACS							

3. Project requirements

3.1. Project staff

Although, as explained below, I have acquired the skills needed to implement empirical studies and have established a network of project partners that ensures that these studies are run according to the current state-of-the-art in empirical social sciences, further support is needed in this area. This is because conducting empirical studies is highly time- and labour-intensive at a level that would be prohibitive for productive philosophical work. Implementing the project therefore critically requires support by a methodologically well-trained part-time **research associate (RA)** as well as a **student assistant (SA)**, for the entire duration of the project (24 months). The research associate will be strongly involved in participant recruitment and scheduling, the actual running of the studies, and data management. S/he will also assist in finalizing the design of the studies and producing the relevant experimental materials as well as in analysing the resulting data and helping to prepare the findings for dissemination (e.g., by producing relevant graphs and tables). For this reason the RA will figure both in project publications as well as in conference presentations. In addition, I believe that this work would allow for the development of an independent doctoral project and am open to this, should the RA be interested. However, I am also open to applicants not intending to begin a doctoral project. Concerning the other staff members, the SA will provide support in literature search, participant recruitment, data collection, and data management.

3.2. Composition of the project group

In addition to the staff positions applied for within this project and the principal investigator, the following researchers will be part of the project group:

- Dr Martin Bruder, DAAD team leader.
- Prof Dr Sabine Döring, Department of Philosophy, University of Tübingen.
- Prof Dr Sabine Roeser, Department of Philosophy, TU Delft and University of Twente.
- Dr Simone Schnall, Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, University of Cambridge.
- Prof Dr Peter Stemmer, Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz.

3.3. Cooperation with other researchers

Beyond the members of the project team, I will collaborate with several partners both in Germany and abroad and both from philosophy and psychology. They are the following:

- Prof Dr. Antony Manstead, Department of Psychology, Cardiff University.
- Dr. Gwenda Simons, Department of Experimental Psychology, Oxford University.
- Dr. Michael Schmitz, Department of Philosophy; University of Wien.
- Prof Dr. Tornbjörn Tännsjö, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University.
- Prof Dr. Folke Tersman, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
- Prof Dr. Marcel Weber, Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva.

3.4. Benefit of the established collaborative networks

The collaboration with Dr. Bruder and the support of the Zukunftskolleg has been critical to this proposal in several respects. First, getting acquainted with social psychological theories concerning the nature of intuitions and the role of emotions in moral decision making has been informative in developing the arguments presented in the joint manuscript and in this application. Second, working with a methodologically well-versed social psychologist has allowed me to develop empirical studies that use advanced experimental paradigms to try to gauge intuitions. Third, the pilot project has allowed me to build an academic network that also includes prominent social and cognitive psychologists with an interest in this project (see above). Although this is clearly a philosophical research project, the involvement of trained psychologists as project partners at all levels of the proposed research will ensure that the empirical elements of the work will fully meet the established standards of empirical work in the social sciences. In addition, the research associate who will carry out the empirical work will be a qualified social psychologist.

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- Williams, B. A. O. (1973). A critique of utilitarianism. In J. J. Smart & B. A. O. Williams (Eds.), *Utilitarianism: For and against* (pp. 77-151). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolf, S. (1982). Moral saints. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 79, 419-439.

Financial Plan

I. Amount applied for from the BW Stiftung

1. Staff costs

Position	Duration	Costs
Research Associate (EG13, 50%)	24 months	€ 57,300
Student Assistant (20h/month)	24 months	€ 4,570
Personnel costs in total:		€ 61,870

Personnel costs for the research associate (i.e., researcher at the level of a doctoral student) follow DFG guidelines (http://www.dfg.de/formulare/60_12/60_12.pdf). At Konstanz, student research assistants (ungeprüfte hiwi) are hired on the basis of hours per month at an hourly rate of € 9.52.

2. Travel Expenses

To ensure maximum dissemination of both the conceptual work resulting from this project and the empirical findings, I plan to present the results on a number of conferences and workshops.

Travel	Costs
Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology in 2014, European location tba	€ 1,200
Workshop of the Experimental Philosophy Group UK in 2015, UK location tba	€ 1,000
2 x Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in 2015, US location tba	€ 1,800
Travel Costs in Total:	€ 4,000

2.1. Visiting Researchers

These expenses will be covered from Zukunftskolleg funds. For details see below.

2.2. Workshop Funding

I am planning to conduct one international project-related workshop toward the end of the project period. The main goal of this workshop is to discuss the project results with prominent philosophers as well as psychologists. In particular, I will invite all cooperation partners (see Section 4) as well as other researchers with an interest in the topic. The upper limit of the invitees will be 12 and the budget is calculated accordingly. Travel expenses (return trip to Konstanz): 450€/per person (final individual costs may vary, depending on where the participant will come from). Accommodation: 3 nights/person; Daily expenses: 24€/day/person (according to the Landesreisekostengesetz), for two days.

End of project workshop	Costs
Travel costs	€ 5,400
Accommodation	€ 2,880
Daily expenses	€ 576
Complementary support by the University of Konstanz: rooms and equipment	free
Workshop Costs in Total:	€ 8,856

3. Consumables

The following funds are required to recruit and remunerate participants:

Participant payment	Costs
Experiment 1	120 x € 8 € 960
Experiment 2	120 x € 8 € 960
Experiment 3	120 x € 8 € 960
Experiment 4	150 x € 8 € 1,200
Experiment 5	120 x € 8 € 960
Experiment 6	100 x € 8 € 960
Other Costs in Total:	€ 6,000

4. Investments

FaceReader is required for the analysis of nonverbal emotional expressions in Research Line B. The research associate will need to be trained in using the *Facial Action Coding System* (FACS) to confirm coding of the nonverbal behaviour. Finally, *Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count* (LIWC2007) is a text analyses program needed for the content analyses of written texts in Research Line C. Since, according to the rules of the BW Stiftung, investments are only financed for the duration of the project (two years), the figures here represent 2/3 of the price of the mentioned equipments (softwares). The remaining third comes from the institutional resources of the applicant (see below).

Equipments	Costs
FaceReader software by Noldus Information Technology incl. camera and illumination	€ 4,800
FACS manual and final test	€ 223
LIWC2007 software	45 €
Equipment Costs in Total:	€ 5,068

II. Amount provided by Zukunftskolleg co-funding

1. Staff costs

Position	Duration	Costs
Student Assistant (20 h/month)	24 months	€ 4,570
Personnel costs in total:		€ 4,570

At Konstanz, student research assistants (ungeprüfte HiWi) are hired on the basis of hours per month at an hourly rate of € 9.52.

2. Travel costs: visiting researchers.

Three of the cooperation partners (Prof Dr Sabine Döring, Prof Dr Sabine Roeser, Dr Simone Schnall) will visit Konstanz in early stages of the project (2014) to give advice on conceptual issues concerning the relationship between intuitions and emotions (Döring, Roeser) and methodological issues concerning the measurement of these constructs (Schnall). The total cost of each visit from abroad will be approximately € 950 (flight and transit: € 400; hotel accommodation: € 400; subsistence: € 150). The one national trip will likely have somewhat lower travel costs (€ 200). Accordingly, the total sum requested is $2 \times € 950 + € 750 = € 2,650$

4. Investments

As mentioned above, 1/3 of the price of the two softwares to be used will be funded from the applicant's own funds.

Equipments	Costs
FaceReader software by Noldus Information Technology incl. camera and illumination	€ 2,400
LIWC2007 software	€ 22
Equipment Costs in Total:	€ 2,422

III. Summary of budget

Budget items	Costs
Staff costs	€ 66,440
↳ Zukunftskolleg contribution	€ 4,570
Travel expenses	€ 15,506
↳ Zukunftskolleg contribution	€ 2,650
Consumables	€ 6,000
Investments	€ 7,490
↳ Zukunftskolleg contribution	€ 2,422
Sum	€ 95,436
↳ Zukunftskolleg contribution (%)	€ 9,642 (10,1%)

Details On Academic Career

I. Curriculum Vitae

Personal Details

Name: Attila Tanyi
Date of Birth: 30 January, 1976
Place of Birth: Miskolc, Hungary
Citizenship: Hungarian
Mailing address: Zukunftscolleg, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany
Phone: +49 (0)7531 88 5658
Email: attila.tanyi@uni-konstanz.de
Marital status: Married, one child
Gender: Male

Areas of Specialisation

Practical reason and rationality, moral psychology, moral and political philosophy, experimental philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of action, metaphysics, economic philosophy (Hayek and the Austrian School)

Areas of Competence

Legal theory, applied ethics (bioethics, political morality), history of philosophy (utilitarianism, Sidgwick, Moore, Bentham, J.S. Mill, Rawls, Mackie), political theory (constitutionalism)

Academic Positions

2012-2013	Interim Professor (W-3 Vertretung, Prof. Dr. Rainer Hegselmann) Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany
2010-2015	Research Fellow and Junior Research Leader Zukunftscolleg and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Germany
2009	Bolyai Fellow (3+3 years) Department of Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary (declined)
2009	Mobilitas Fellow (3+1 years) Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu, Estonia (declined)
2007-2009	Postdoctoral Fellow Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, Sweden
2005-2008	Temporary Lecturer Delta School of Politics, Budapest, Hungary
2004-2005	Visiting researcher in Philosophy Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo, Norway
2003-2004	Guest Lecturer, Institute for Social and European Studies Berzsényi Dániel College, Szombathely, Hungary
2002-2003	Visiting researcher in Philosophy Jesus College, University of Oxford, UK

Educational Background

- 2007 Ph.D. in Philosophy
Eötvös Lóránd University (ELTE), Budapest, Hungary
Doctoral thesis in Political Science accepted as Ph.D. in Philosophy
- 2001-2006 Ph.D. in Political Science (Social and Political Theory Track)
Department of Political Science, Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary
Thesis Title: An Essay On the Desire-Based Reasons Model
Committee: Krister Bykvist (Oxford), Ferenc Huoranszki (CEU), János Kis (CEU).
Defended: 14 December 2006 'magna cum laude'
- 2000-2001 M.Phil. in Political Science (Social and Political Theory Track)
Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
(GPA: 3.81; Average class GPA: 3.43)
Thesis Title: Reason and Justification
- 1999-2000 M.A. in Political Science (with distinction)
Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
(GPA: 3.97; Average class GPA: 3.41)
Thesis Title: Liberal Patriotism
- 1997-1999 M.Sc. in Economics (with distinction)
Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
Major: Economic Policy; Minor: Applied Statistics
Thesis Title: Market and Justice?
- 1995-1996 Diploma in Political Theory (with distinction)
Eötvös Lóránd University, Department of Political Theory
Budapest, Hungary
- 1994-1997 B.A. in Economics (with distinction)
Corvinus University of Budapest (formerly: Budapest University of Economic Sciences), Budapest, Hungary

Fellowships, Grants, and Awards

Major project grants

- 2011-2014 'Consequentialism and Its Demands: On the Authority of Consequentialism.' DFG (German Research Foundation) research grant, one doctoral position and related travel, research and overhead expenses, approx. 130 000 EUR

Major fellowships

- 2010-2014 Zukunftskolleg Fellowship, University of Konstanz, Germany.
- 2009 Mobilitas Fellowship, 3 (+1) years, University of Tartu, Estonia (declined).
- 2009 Bolyai Fellowship, 3 (+3) years, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary (declined).
- 2008-2009 Swedish Research Council Postdoctoral Fellowship, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden.
- 2007-2008 Swedish Institute Guest Scholarship for postdoctoral research, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden.
- 2004-2005 Norwegian Research Fellowship, University of Oslo, Department of Philosophy, Norway.

- 2004-2005 Swedish Institute Guest Scholarship for part of PhD studies, Uppsala University, Department of Philosophy, Sweden (declined).
- 1999-2004 CEU Full Fellowship for master and doctoral level studies at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.
- 2002-2003 OSI/FCO British Chevening Scholarship, Jesus College, Oxford, UK.

Awards

- 2009 Hungarian State Eötvös Fellowship for postdoctoral research.
- 2005 CEU Award for Advanced Doctoral Students, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.
- 2000 Pro Universitate Award, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary.
- 1998 Award from the Sándor Győző Foundation for outstanding studies at Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary.

Minor grants and scholarships

- 2013 Co-funding grant, for a scientific retreat, Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Germany
- 2011 Scientific retreat, funding granted by the Young Scholar Fund, University of Konstanz, Germany.
- 2011 Scientific retreat, funding granted by the Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Germany.
- 2011-2012 Mentorship Grant, mentor: Dr. Krister Bykvist, from the Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Germany.
- 2010-2011 Co-funding grant, with Martin Bruder, for the project 'Overdemanding Consequentialism? Experiments on moral intuitions.', from the Zukunftskolleg, approx. 10 000 EUR, University of Konstanz, Germany.
- 2010-2011 Mentorship Grant, mentor: Prof. Christoph Fehige, from the Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Germany.
- 2002 EUSSIRF Grant at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
- 2001 Grant from the University of Oslo to participate in the summer seminar World Hunger and Morality, Oslo, Norway.
- 1999 Grant from the AES Corporation.
- 1998, 1999, 2004 Scholarship from the Foundation for Political History, Budapest, Hungary.
- 1998-2000 Scholarship from the Republic of Hungary for studies at Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary.
- 1997-1999 Scholarship for Outstanding Students, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary.

Languages

Hungarian (native)
 English (fluent)
 Portuguese (intermediate)
 German (intermediate)
 Swedish (basic)

References

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- Torbjörn Tännsjö
Kristian Cläeson Professor of Practical Philosophy, Philosophy Department
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Website: http://people.su.se/~tanns/index_en.htm

II. List of Publications

Books

In English

2007 *An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model*, Doctoral dissertation, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary,
URL: <<http://politicalscience.ceu.hu/node/23764>>

In Hungarian

2008 'Egészségpolitika és etika' ('Health Policy and Ethics'). DEMOS Hungary, DEMOS studies, 2008 Summer

2000 *Piac és igazságosság?* ('Market and Justice?') Budapest, Hungary: Napvilág

Publications in journals and edited volumes

In English

2013 'Consequentialism and Its Demands: A Representative Study', with Martin Bruder, forthcoming in *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, a special issue edited by Sabine Roeser and Joel Rickard.

2013 'Immortal Curiosity', with Karl Karlander, forthcoming in *The Philosophical Forum*.

2013 'Silencing Desires?', forthcoming in *Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel*.

2012 'The Case for Authority'. In Schleidgen, S. (Ed.): *Should we always act morally? Essays on Overridingness*, pp. 159-189. Marburg, Germany: Tectum.

2011 'Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.' *Philosophical Studies* 152 (2): 209-227.

2011 'Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire.' *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 14: 101-115.

2010 'Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires.' *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, 6(2): 67-89.

2009 'Desire-based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons from Moore and Parfit.' *Polish Journal of Philosophy* 3:2, pp. 87-107.

2009 'The Desire-based Reasons Model, Naturalism and Tolerable Revisionism: Lessons from Moore and Parfit.' In Mario Šilar & Felipe Schwember Augier (eds.), *Racionalidad práctica. Intencionalidad, normatividad y reflexividad / Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity*, special issue of *Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico* (Serv. Publicaciones Univ. de Navarra), N° 212, pp. 49-57

2006 'Naturalism and Triviality.' *Philosophical Writings*, Issue 32, Summer 2006, pp. 12-30.

In Hungarian

2013 'Demokrácia és igazolás' ('Democracy and Justification'). Forthcoming in a volume for the 70th birthday of János Kis, edited by Attila Gábor Tóth.

- 2013 'Mennyire lehet nehéz? A túlzott követelések ellenvetésének újszerű megközelítései' ('How Hard Can It Get? Novel Approaches to the Overdemandingness Objection'). Forthcoming in *Cafe Babel*.
- 2006 'Norvégia és az Európai Unió' ('Norway and the European Union'). Europeum, Center for European Policy.
- 2009 'A Frankfurti Iskola és 1968.' ('The Frankfurt School and 1968.') *Fordulat*, New Series 3:2 (Winter).
- 2007 'Rawls különbözeti elve.' ('Rawls' Difference Principle.') *Hungarian Review of Political Science*, 16:2, pp. 125-150.
- 2007 'A Harmadik Út értékrendszere.' ('The Values of the Third Way.') *Progresszív politika* ('Progressive Politics'), Spring/Autumn, pp. 8-30.
- 2004 'Erkölcsei igazolás és politikai kötelezettség.' ('Moral Justification and Political Legitimacy.') *Hungarian Journal of Legal Theory*, 2004/4.
- 1998 'A Frankfurti Iskola és 1968' ('The Frankfurt School and 1968'). *Fordulat* Spring/Summer 1998, pp. 53-94.
- 1998 'John Rawls politikai és gazdasági filozófiája' ('The Political and Economic Philosophy of John Rawls'). *Fordulat* Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 7-21.
- 1997 'Lehetséges-e alternatív gazdaságpolitika?' ('Is There An Alternative Economic Policy?'). *Eszmélet*, December

Revise and Resubmit

'Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach', with Martin Bruder. Revisions due: July 2013. Journal: *Utilitas*.

'Prospects for a New Methodology to Assess Moral Intuitions in Experimental Philosophy: A Case Study', with Martin Bruder. Under review as part of an edited volume (editors: Christoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch, Matthias Uhl) on experimental ethics, at Palgrave Macmillan. Resubmitted: May 2013.

Under review

'Fejezetek a kozmopolitanizmus és univerzalizmus filozófiai történetéből' ('Chapters from the philosophical history of cosmopolitanism and universalism'), with Eric Brown. Submitted: March 2013.

'What Is It that We Believe? Lord on Dancy', submitted: May 2013.

'Can Reasons Be Propositions?', with Matteo Morganti. Submitted: March 2013.

'Pure Cognitivism and Beyond', submitted: February 2013.

'Between Boredom and Ignorance: On the Problems of an Everlasting Deity', with Vuko Andric. Submitted: July 2012.

Work in Progress

'Self-respect and the Demands of Equality.'

'On *The Road* to Meaning.'

'Virtue, Silencing, and Desires.'

'Demands, Anticipated Emotions, and Moral Decision-Making', with Martin Bruder.

'Honesty, Publicity, and Error Theory', with Vuko Andric.

Conference Papers and Presentations

Refereed

- 10/2013 *Can Reasons Be Propositions?*, "Reasons: Action, Belief, Perception", University of Saarland, Saarbrücken, Germany
- 06/2013 *Can Reasons Be Propositions?* Swedish Congress of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden
- 06/2013 *Immortal Curiosity*, Society for Applied Philosophy, Annual conference, University of Zurich, Switzerland
- 09/2012 *Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach*, 3rd UK experimental philosophy workshop, University of Nottingham, UK.
- 09/2012 *Can Reasons Be Propositions?*, SIFA 2012, Alghero, University of Sassari, Italy.
- 09/2012 *Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach*, "The Scope and Limits of Experimental Ethics", GAP 8 workshop, University of Konstanz, Germany.
- 09/2012 *Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach*, GAP 8, University of Konstanz, Germany.
- 05/2012 *Between Boredom and Ignorance: On the Problems of an Omnitemporal Deity*, 2nd Glasgow Philosophy of Religion Seminar, University of Glasgow, Scotland.
- 05/2012 *Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach*, Experiments on Ethical Dilemmas workshop, London, UK (invitation declined).
- 10/2011 *Overdemanding Consequentialism? A Study on Intuitions and Emotions*, European Workshop on Experimental Philosophy, Eindhoven, The Netherlands (invitation declined).
- 09/2011 *Overdemanding Consequentialism? A Study on Intuitions and Emotions*, 2nd UK experimental philosophy workshop (invitation declined).
- 09/2011 *Silencing Desires?*, ECAP 7, Milan, Italy (invitation declined).
- 06/2011 *Divine Boredom*, 'Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century', Krakow, Poland (invitation declined).
- 06/2011 *Overdemanding Consequentialism? Experiments on Moral Intuitions and Emotions*. ISUS XI conference, 'The Ethics of Economic Development', Lucca, Italy.
- 05/2011 *Overdemanding Consequentialism? Experiments on Moral Intuitions and Emotions*. 'Moral Emotions and Intuitions' conference, The Hague, The Netherlands.
- 07/2010 *What's (Really) Wrong With Pure Cognitivism*, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Dublin, Ireland.
- 04/2010 *Divine Boredom*, Philosophy of Religion Seminar, Glasgow, Scotland (invited, could not attend).
- 08/2008 *Reason and Desire: The Role of Pleasure*, 1st RoME Conference, Boulder, Colorado, USA (invitation declined).
- 08/2008 *Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires*, ECAP 6: European Society for Analytical Philosophy Conference, Krakow, Poland.

- 07/2008 *Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-breaking*, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Aberdeen, Scotland.
- 04/2008 *Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons from Moore and Parfit*, XLV Reuniones Filosoficas, 'Practical Rationality, Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity', University of Navarra, Pamplona, Spain.
- 08/2006 *Naturalism and Triviality*, "Problems and Prospects for Ethical Naturalism", University of Durham, England.
- 07/2006 *The Case for Authority*, "Ethics and Demandingness", The AHRC Scottish Ethics Network International Conference, Dundee, Scotland.
- 08/2005 *Naturalism and Triviality*, ECAP 5: European Society for Analytical Philosophy Conference, Lisbon, Portugal.
- 07/2005 *The Case for Authority*, International Congress of the Society for Applied Philosophy, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, UK.
- 05/2003 *Non-cognitivism and Normative Authority*, "Scepticism", The First Free University of Amsterdam Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
- 04/2003 *The Case for Authority*, "Utilitarianism, Human Rights and Globalisation", 7th International Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, Lisbon, Portugal.
- 05/2001 *Well-being, Morality, and Justification*, Annual Conference of the UK Association for Legal and Social Philosophy, Royal Holloway, Egham, UK.
- 04/2000 *Democracy and Justification*, "Brave New World" Conference in Political Philosophy, University of Manchester, UK.
- 04/1999 *Self-Respect and the Demands of Equality*, 1st Essex Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy, University of Essex, Colchester, UK.
- Invited
- 01/2013 *Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach*, Research Forum, Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany.
- 05/2012 *Between Boredom and Ignorance: On the Problems of an Omnitemporal Deity*, Department of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
- 01/2012 *How Hard Can It Get? Novel Approaches to the Overdemandingness Objection to Consequentialism*, Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, Norway.
- 05/2011 *Reasons – Facts or Propositions*, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Sweden.
- 05/2011 *Immortal Curiosity*, Department of Philosophy, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany.
- 04/2011 *Silencing Desires?*, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden.
- 12/2010 *What's (Really) Wrong With Pure Cognitivism*, Konstanz-Zurich colloquium, Ethics Centre, University of Zurich, Switzerland.
- 12/2010 *Silencing Desires?*, Faculty Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Germany.

- 06/2010 *What's (Really) Wrong With Pure Cognitivism*, Language and Rationality Seminar, CSMN, Oslo, Norway.
- 06/2010 *Divine Boredom*, with Karl Karlander, Moral Philosophy Club, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), Oslo, Norway.
- 04/2010 *What's (Really) Wrong With Pure Cognitivism*, Philosophy Department, Stockholm University, Sweden.
- 04/2010 *Divine Boredom*, Philosophy Department, University of Tartu, Estonia.
- 06/2009 *Hurtig On Fittingness*, Invited response, 'The Metaphysics of Normativity' workshop, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden.
- 04/2009 *Against Dancy's Pure Cognitivism*, Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
- 11/2008 *Reason and Desire: The Role of Pleasure*, Department of Philosophy, Gothenburg University, Sweden.
- 10/2008 *Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-breaking*, 'Acting for a Reason: Normativity and Mentality in a World of Causality' workshop, Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala, Sweden.
- 10/2008 *Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires*, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Sweden.
- 10/2007 *Reason and Desire: The Role of Pleasure (and Pain)*, Forum for Theoretical Philosophy, ELTE, Budapest, Hungary.
- 04/2007 *Politics and Justice*, György Bence Memorial Conference, College for Social Theory, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary.
- 03/2007 *Reason and Desire*, Department of Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.
- 11/2005 *Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Philosophy: Historical Investigations*, Conference on Globalization, Institute of Political History, Budapest, Hungary.
- 06/2004 *Political Economy and Socialism*, Roundtable Discussion, Participants: Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos, Russel Hardin, János Kis, John Mueller, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.
- 12/2002 *Rawls on Stability*, Invited Response at the Junior Fellows Conference, Institute für die Wissenschaften der Menschen, Vienna, Austria.

III. Previous Involvement in Academic Teaching

As Lecturer, graduate course

- 2012/2013 *Political Philosophy*, Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany, Philosophy and Economics M.A. program, lecture and seminar [in English]
- 2011/2012 *G.E. Moore's 'Principia Ethica'*, University of Konstanz, Department of Philosophy, Hauptseminar [in English]
- 2010/2011 *Henry Sidgwick's 'The Methods of Ethics'*, University of Konstanz, Department of Philosophy, Hauptseminar [in English]
- 2009/2010 *The Philosophy of John Rawls*, University of Konstanz, Department of Philosophy, Hauptseminar [in English]
- 2008/2009 *Demandingness of Morality*, Stockholm University, Department of Philosophy, National course, with Torbjörn Tännsjö [in English]
- 2007/2008 *Practical Reasons*, Stockholm University, Department of Philosophy, National course, with Torbjörn Tännsjö [in English]
- 2003/2004 *Contemporary Theories of Justice*, M.A. Course, Institute for Social and European Studies, Szombathely, [in Hungarian]

As Lecturer, undergraduate course

- 2012/2013 *Identity and Morality*, Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany [in English]
- 2012/2013 *Theories of Justice*, Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany [in English]
- 2012/2013 *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany [in English]
- 2012/2013 *Politics and Morality*, Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany [in English]
- 2012/2013 *Consequentialism and Its Demands*, Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany [in English]
- 2012/2013 *Bioethics: Distributive Questions in Health Care*, Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany [in English]
- 2011/2012 *Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction Into the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Proseminar, Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Germany [in English]
- 2012/2013 *John Stuart Mill's moral philosophy*, Proseminar, Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Germany [in English]
- 2010/2011 *John Mackie's 'Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong'*, Proseminar, Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Germany [in English]
- 2007/2009 *Personal Identity and Morality*, Stockholm University, Department of Philosophy, Candidate course [in English]
- 2006/2008 *Politics and Morality*, Delta School of Politics, Budapest [in Hungarian]

- 2003/2004 *Themes from John Rawls' Moral Philosophy*, Honours Course, College for Social Theory, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest [in Hungarian]
- 2002/2003 *Political Legitimacy*, Honours Course, College for Social Theory, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest [in Hungarian]
- 2001/2002 *Democratic Theory*, Honours Course, College for Social Theory, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary [in Hungarian]
- 2001/2002 *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Honours Course, College for Social Theory, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary [in Hungarian]

As Teaching assistant

- 2005/2006 *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, M.A. Course, Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest [in English]
- 1997/1999 *Introduction to Political Science*, B.A. Course, Department of Political Science, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary [in Hungarian]

Supervision

- 2011-present Doctoral dissertation, Vuko Andric, Provisional title: 'An Essay on the Act-consequentialist Criterion of Rightness'.
- 2007-2009 MSc in International Finance thesis tutoring, Joint Program of the International Business School, Budapest, Hungary and Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK [in English]

IV. Previous Involvement in Academic Self-Administration

Ongoing projects (as project leader)

- 2011-2014 'Consequentialism and Its Demands: On the Authority of Consequentialism.' DFG (German Research Foundation) research grant (Sachbeihilfe), one doctoral position and related travel and research expenses, approx. 130 000 EUR
- Participants:* Attila Tanyi (Konstanz, project leader); Vuko Andric (doctoral student in the project, Konstanz); Gottfried Seebass (Konstanz); Christoph Fehige (Saarbrücken); Thomas Schmidt (Berlin); Krister Bykvist (Oxford); Peter Stemmer (Konstanz); Stephan Schlothfeldt (Konstanz); Kent Hurtig (Stirling); Tornbjörn Tännsjö (Stockholm); Jonas Olson (Stockholm)
- 2010-2012 'Overdemanding Consequentialism? Experiments on Moral Intuitions.' Zukunftskolleg (University of Konstanz, Germany) co-funding grant, with Martin Bruder (Zukunftskolleg, psychology), approx. 20 000 EUR
- Participants:* Martin Bruder (Psychology, Konstanz), Attila Tanyi (Philosophy, Konstanz).

Refereeing

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
Acta Analytica
Organon F
Independent Start-up Research Grant, Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz
Manfred Ulmer Stipendium, Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz
Suhrkamp Verlag

Other Professional Activities

- 2011 Involvement in the writing of the Zukunftskolleg section of the Excellence Initiative application of the University of Konstanz
- 2011 Independent Start-up Research Grant, Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Member of Decision Committee
- 2011 Manfred Ulmer Stipendium, Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Member of Decision Committee
- 1995-1999 Member of Executive Committee, College for Social Theory

Organizational experience

- 11/2013 'The Dimensions of Consequentialism', A symposium on Martin Peterson's forthcoming book 'The Dimensions of Consequentialism' (CUP), November 16-17, University of Konstanz, Germany. Confirmed participants: Martin Peterson (Eindhoven), Vuko Andric (Konstanz), Brad Hooker (Reading), Roger Crisp (Oxford), Campbell Brown (Edinburgh), Matthew Braham (Bayreuth), Thomas Schmidt (Berlin), Jan Gertken (Berlin), Joanna Burch-Brown (Bristol), Frances Howard-Snyder (Washington). Expressions of interests by *Ethics*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, and *Economics and Philosophy* to publish contributions to the workshop.
- 09/2013 'Consequentialism and Reasons: Ethical and Meta-ethical Perspectives', 3rd Konstanz Philosophical Retreat (three-day workshop), September 26-29, Insel Reichenau, Germany. Confirmed participants: Attila Tanyi (Konstanz), Matthew Braham (Bayreuth), Christoph Fehige (Saarbrücken), Vuko Andric (Konstanz),

Thomas Schmidt (Berlin), Kent Hurtig (Stirling), Eric Carlson (Uppsala), Sebastian Köhler (Edinburgh), Susanne Mantel (Saarbrücken), Tim Henning (Giesen), Tatja Visak (Monash), Benjamin Kiesewetter (Berlin)

10/2012 'Reason, Sentiment, Value', 2nd Konstanz Philosophical Retreat (three-day workshop), October 3-6, Insel Reichenau, Germany. Participants: Attila Tanyi (Konstanz), Matthew Braham (Bayreuth), Christoph Fehige (Saarbrücken), Vuko Andric (Konstanz), Thomas Schmidt (Berlin), Kent Hurtig (Stirling), Jonas Olson (Stockholm), Daniel Ramöller (Stockholm), Gustaf Arrhenius (Stockholm), Karl Karlander (Stockholm), Susanne Mantel (Saarbrücken), Julius Schälike (Konstanz), Sabine Roeser (Delft)

09/2011 'Consequentialism: New Developments', 1st Konstanz Philosophical Retreat (three-day workshop), September 27-30, Insel Reichenau, Germany. Participants: Attila Tanyi (Konstanz), Christoph Fehige (Saarbrücken), Vuko Andric (Konstanz), Thomas Schmidt (Berlin), Kent Hurtig (Stirling), Jonas Olson (Stockholm), Susanne Mantel (Saarbrücken), Eric Brown (Budapest), Krister Bykvist (Oxford)

Membership

German Philosophical Society
German Society for Analytical Philosophy
American Philosophical Association, International Associate Member
UK Association for Legal and Social Philosophy
International Society for Utilitarian Studies
British Society for Ethical Theory
Society for Applied Philosophy
European Society for Analytical Philosophy
Aristotelian Society

V. Details on International Mobility

Academic stays (outside Hungary and Germany)

2009	Mobilitas Fellow (3+1 years) Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu, Estonia (declined)
2007-2009	Postdoctoral Fellow Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, Sweden
2004-2005	Visiting researcher in Philosophy Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo, Norway
2002-2003	Visiting researcher in Philosophy Jesus College, University of Oxford, UK

Academic co-operations (with scholars outside Germany)

2014	Senior fellow: David Sobel, Syracuse University, USA
2013-2014	Mentorship: Christoph Lumer, University of Siena, Italy
2012	Mentorship: Krister Bykvist, Oxford, Jesus College, UK
2011 -	Project collaborations: see ongoing projects above
2011 -	International workshops: see organizational experience above

VI. Details on Future Career

My primary aim for the future is to become a *professor of philosophy* in a German university. To achieve this aim, I focus on gaining experience and improve my abilities in research, teaching, and administration. The major milestones along the way are:

- Building up and maintaining my own research group in the Zukunftskolleg at the University of Konstanz.
- Achieving success in publishing the results of my research.
- Carrying out new research projects.
- Becoming excellent in teaching and supervision at the University of Konstanz.
- Improving my administration skills and experience at the University of Konstanz.

The funding applied for from Baden-Württemberg Foundation would significantly contribute to the achievement of these aims. A successful application would make it possible for me to carry out a new *research project* with the strong potential for further publications. In this regard, a major synergic effect of the newly granted funding would be the interaction between my present research project and the newly established one. At present I am the principal investigator of a DFG-funded project on “Consequentialism and Its Demands: On the Authority of Consequentialism.” The project has the same problematic – overdemandingness - as its starting point just as the present proposal does, but it takes an entirely different approach to it. The ongoing project aims to examine the philosophical foundations of the authority-based reading of the objection, with particular focus on theories of reasons. Given that the two projects share the same general problematic, despite their respective approaches being different, I expect that there will be a productive interaction between the ongoing project and the project described in this application. Ultimately, the resulting new publications and research directions, as well as the gain in administrative experience and academic contacts (both national and international), would make it possible for me to successfully complete my *habilitation* at the University of Konstanz, thereby making a significant step towards the professorship.

Although research excellence is a major milestone on the way to a professorship, experience and excellence in *teaching* are equally important ingredients in a successful academic career. Accordingly, during the two years of the project and despite the fact that my position in the Zukunftskolleg is research-only, I will focus, just as I did in the past, on offering seminars – both project-related as well as unrelated – to students of the University of Konstanz. It is for the same reason that I have accepted the invitation to serve as an Interim Professor (W3 Vertretung, Nachfolger von Prof. Dr. Rainer Hegselmann) in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bayreuth in the present academic year. And the same considerations led me, with permission by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Konstanz, to become the supervisor of Vuko Andric’s doctoral dissertation, entitled *An Essay on the Act-Consequentialist Criterion of Rightness* (the dissertation is planned to be submitted and defended later this year). Completing a habilitation would once again help me on both counts: it would give me the right to offer lectures as well as to supervise, without the department’s permission, both undergraduate and graduate theses at the University of Konstanz. Finally, in order to improve my teaching skills, I have contacted and had several consultation sessions with the Academic Staff Development section of the University of Konstanz. Another plan I have for the future is to deepen my cooperation with the section by taking courses offered by them.

Last but not least, a successful project application would give me the opportunity to further improve my *administration* experience and skills, since running such projects involves dealing with financial, personal, as well as other administrative matters. Again, I have experience in this regard to build upon and in the two years of the project I would like to further and improve this existing experience. Thus, as mentioned above, I am project leader of another research project and presently also act as an interim professor. Furthermore, since the Zukunftskolleg is a self-governing institution, my tenure as a fellow sees me taking part in many of the institution’s diverse activities. Finally, just as with teaching, I plan to take part in professional courses on academic management, either in Konstanz or elsewhere in Germany.