Consequentialism and Its Demands: On the Authority of Consequentialism

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Research Grant ('Sachbeihilfe')
DFG-Erstantrag

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1. General information.

First-time proposal (‘Erstantrag’) for a research grant (‘Sachbeihilfe’) in the field of philosophy.

1.1. Applicant.

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1.2. Topic (Thema).

Consequentialist demands, consequentialist reasons for action, and the authority of consequentialism.

Konsequentialistische Anforderungen, konsequentialistische Handlungsgründe und die Autorität des Konsequentialismus.

1.3. Research area and field of work.

Discipline: philosophy (108), practical philosophy (108-3).

Area of specialization: ethics, meta-ethics (theory of reasons).

1.4. Anticipated total duration.

The project has not yet begun; the project’s intended duration is 3 years; projected DFG funding is for 3 years.

1.5. Application period.

April 1, 2011 – March 31, 2014. Funding is to begin: April 1, 2011.

1.6. Summary (Zusammenfassung).

According to consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal point of view. It is often claimed that this requirement is so demanding that it is unacceptable for any agent to follow it. The project aims to break with current trends in discussing this so-called Overdemandingness Objection by focusing on a less investigated aspect of consequentialist demands: their authority. The Objection thus takes the following form: consequentialism is overdemanding because it requires us, with decisive force, to do things that we do not have decisive reason to perform. The project argues that this is the only defensible interpretation of the Objection and, accordingly, responding to the Objection will require us to deny this interpretation. In doing so, the project assesses the truth of three claims that are needed for the Objection to go through: there are reasons to act morally; there are reasons to act as consequentialism requires; consequentialist reasons override

other conflicting reasons of the agent. The project argues for the truth of the first two claims, but rejects the third claim as false. In its approach this is a moral enterprise, but in its significance it is also political. In our world the demands of consequentialism are real: pressing moral questions with clear practical implications arise in both the national and the international arena; answering them makes examination of the Objection an important task.

Keywords: consequentialism, consequentialist demands, consequentialist reasons, moral authority.

Dem Konsequentialismus zufolge ist die richtige Handlung diejenige, die das beste Resultat für die Allgemeinheit produziert. Es wird oft behauptet, dass diese Anforderung so fordernd ist, dass sie für den Handelnden nicht akzeptabel ist. Das Projekt wird sich von der bisherigen Diskussion des Überforderungseinwands absetzen, indem es sich insbesondere mit einem vernachlässigten Aspekt konsequentialistischer Anforderungen beschäftigen wird: deren Autorität. Der Überforderungseinwand nimmt also folgende Form an: der Konequentialismus ist überfordernd, da er uns entschieden abverlangt, Dinge zu tun, für deren Durchführung wir keine entscheidenden Gründe haben. Das Projekt wird argumentieren, dass dies die einzig vertretbare Interpretation des Überforderungseinwands ist und dementsprechend, dass eine Widerlegung des Überforderungseinwands eine Ablehnung des Einwands in dieser Interpretation verlangt. Letzteres wird das Projekt tun, indem es den Wahrheitswert der folgenden drei Aussagen, die mit dem Überforderungseinwand einhergehen, bewerten wird: es gibt Gründe, moralisch zu handeln; es gibt Gründe so zu handeln, wie es der Kosequentialismus fordert; konsequentialistische Gründe übertrumpfen andere widerstreitende Gründe des Handelnden. Das Projekt wird für die Wahrheit der ersten beiden Aussagen argumentieren, jedoch die dritte Aussage ablehnen. In seiner Herangehensweise ist das Projekt ein moralisches Unterfangen, in seiner Sigifikanz jedoch zudem politisch. In unseren Welt sind die Anforderungen des Konsequntialismus sehr real: dringende moralische Fragen mit klaren praktischen Konsequenzen stellen sich sowohl im nationalen, als auch im internationalen Kontext; deren Beantwortung bedarf einer Untersuchung des Überforderungseinwands.

Schlagwörter: Konsequentialismus, konsequentialistische Anforderungen, konsequentialistische Gründe, Moralische Autorität.

2. State of the art, preliminary work

2.1. Description.

The topic for my research is the so-called **Overdemandingness Objection** or OD (Williams 1973a; Wolf 1982). The primary subject of this objection is act-consequentialism, the view that the right thing to do in any situation is the act with the best consequences as judged from an impersonal point of view (it is a further intriguing question whether other moral theories are also subject to OD – I leave this open in my research, but see e.g. Ashfordp 2003). OD is built upon two pillars: one, that act-consequentialism is extremely demanding and two, that an adequate morality cannot be extremely demanding. Act-consequentialism, in its pure form, requires the agent to promote the good until the point where further efforts would burden the agent as much as they would benefit others. But the situation that determines what would be best overall is far from ideal: today's world, for example, involves mass poverty both in the agent's own country and in the world as a whole; the number of people who donate money to charity is very low; and the institutions that might make things better are not efficient, neither domestically, nor internationally. In fact, even if the demands themselves are not extreme, the iteration of such requirements may easily add up to altogether extreme demands (Cullity 2004). Hence it seems that if one accepts act-consequentialism, one must devote much of one's resources to humanitarian work or to the support of the institutions that carry out this work. At the same time, most of us have a firmly held belief that this cannot be right, that people should not be required to sacrifice their life on the altar of morality. This is the second pillar of the objection. This belief seems to ground a constraint on admissible moral theories requiring them to avoid unacceptable demands. If they do not, we think, these theories should not be allowed to guide our conduct. OD is an attempt to articulate this constraint.

OD has the following structure. (1) Consequentialism makes demand D; (2) demand D is intuitively unacceptable; therefore, (3) consequentialism makes intuitively unacceptable demands; (4) if a moral theory makes unacceptable demands, then we have reason to reject it; therefore, (5) we have reason to reject consequentialism. This more detailed structure illustrates well the possible ways of responding to OD. The strategy of 'denial' rejects premise (1) either because it holds that the premise rests on false empirical facts ('the empirical strategy') or because it aims to restructure consequentialism in such a way that it no longer makes the demand ('the strategy of restructuring'). The strategy of 'extremism' rejects premise (4) by trying to undermine or discredit the intuitions that underlie the premise. Although it is also logically possible to reject premise (2), i.e. to claim that the intuition doesn't exist, this is a move that is rarely (if ever) appealed to in the literature. This is for good reason: it is hard to deny that the intuition exists. This leaves us with the strategy of denial and the strategy of extremism.

Consider first the **strategy of denial**. Take first the ***empirical strategy*** (for a good overview and criticism see Mulgan 2001). Consequentialism says that we should maximise the good. But which actions will maximise the good is an empirical matter. So consequentialism only gives concrete guidance given empirical facts. The empirical strategy urges that given the empirical facts as they actually are, consequentialism does not make the demands that OD attributes to it. The problem with this approach is twofold. First, the facts typically cited could be falsified or explained away. For example, it is often claimed that given the suffering faced by those in deprived countries, our help will only make a minor difference to the worth of their lives - perhaps prolong them a few days, but not significantly increase the quality. However, providing clean water, sanitation and education is relatively cheap, and, in fact, because money goes farther in poorer countries, it is easier to meet the needs of those in poor countries than those in developed ones. The second problem is more general. Since the empirical strategy rests on alleged facts of the actual world, it ties the fate of consequentialism to contingent factors: the facts appealed to may turn out to be non-existent, may disappear in the course of time, or may be defeated as irrelevant. If one is a devoted consequentialist, one can hardly rest content with such an outcome, if one wants to tackle OD.

Turn now to the ***restructuring strategy***. The literature divides into different attempts. *Sub-maximizing consequentialism* claims that an act is wrong if, and only if, of all the actions available to the agent it fails to produce consequences that are 'good enough'; otherwise it is permissible (Slote 1984). That is, when the agent faces a choice between actions all of which would produce 'good enough' consequences, the agent is permitted to choose between them. This view has the potential to avoid demandingness, but only if it can come up with a principled satisficing level, which does not turn out to be overdemanding in the end. An even more serious problem is that satisficing consequentialism appears to be inconsistent with consequentialism (Pettit 1984). For it accepts that one state of affairs may be impartially better than another, yet the agent has no reason to choose this state of affairs over the other. This is not what consequentialism wants to say.

A different attempt moves the consequentialist requirement to a level that does not directly concern action. This is typically done in two ways. One approach distinguishes between the *criterion of right action*, and the *decision-procedure for acting rightly*, and, for empirical reasons, recognizes that act-consequentialism may not give us the best decision-procedure if one wants to maximize good consequences (Railton 1984; a special version of this approach is the *two-level consequentialism* of

Hare 1981). From the viewpoint of OD, the problem is that there is no principled reason why the new, non-consequentialist decision-procedure would not turn out to be unacceptably demanding. Take the decision procedure of always giving priority to those who are most in need. This rule is still intuitively unacceptably demanding; hence OD follows. So what, at best, the consequentialist of this type can claim is that OD might be responded to as a matter of contingent fact, i.e. as a matter of finding acceptably demanding decision procedures. Another difficulty with this approach is that it is unclear how the agent's commitment to act-consequentialism can survive her not acting in accordance with it. And even if this can happen, a further question is how it is possible to compartmentalize the agent's thinking in this way – to think like a consequentialist and act in a non-consequentialist way (McNaughton 1988).

The other approach, *rule-consequentialism* holds that an action is right if, and only if, it is called for by a set of (actual or ideal) rules the following (acceptance or internalization) of which by everyone (or nearly everyone) would result in at least as good consequences, judged impartially, as any other (e.g. Hooker 2000). Then the point seems to be either that it is likely that the optimal result would be produced if people followed rules that are significantly less demanding than the rule of consequentialism; or that it simply costs too much to internalize or follow or accept rules implying that we ought to do what produces the best consequences overall, hence we had better do without the rule of act-consequentialism in our everyday life. There are two concerns that should be raised here. Firstly, the truth of the above claims is an empirical matter - the matter of which rules are such that following (accepting or internalizing) them would have the best consequences (Mulgan 2001). And, again, there is no assurance that these rules will not turn out to be too demanding; this is again a function of contingent facts. Second, one aspect of act-consequentialism is that it seems terribly unfair. The less other people do, the more I am required to do. Perhaps the driving rationale behind rule-consequentialism is to rule out this element of unfairness. But it is far from obvious that all of morality is sensitive to considerations of fairness, i.e. that there are no domains of morality where we cannot appeal to fairness to relieve us of the heavy burden of moral duty.

More recently, three further approaches have emerged. *Limited consequentialism* argues that we should build limits into the structure of consequentialism (Scheffler 1992; 1994), while *cooperative consequentialism* claims that the problem with consequentialism is not that it demands too much, but that its demands are unfair (Murphy 2000). Both views encounter serious difficulties, however. Conceptual problems beset any attempt to find an independent standard for setting an internal limit to consequentialism (Murphy 2000). In addition, without built-in restrictions on certain forms of actions, prerogatives that allow people to limit the demands of consequentialism in their life can lead to the permitting of immoral acts in pursuit of one's interests (Kagan 1984). At the same time, focusing on the fairness of moral demands misses important areas of beneficence (Mulgan 2001). Perhaps the solution is to endorse *combined consequentialism* (Mulgan 2001) that regiments morality into different spheres each with its own guiding rationale and corresponding demands (and the limits to those demands). Much hinges, though, on whether such a bifurcation of morality is a plausible project, and how the different spheres interact with one another.

There are also more general problems with the strategy of restructuring. Two considerations strongly suggest that narrowing the content of consequentialism, by e.g. restructuring the theory, is not required because there is no problem with the overdemanding content of consequentialism. First, some argue that focusing on the overdemanding content of consequentialism is problematic because a moral requirement only transforms into a moral demand if there are reasons supporting the requirement. Hence an overdemanding content is objectionable only if it is backed by reasons, which is not something this reading of OD and the corresponding restructuring strategy has anything to say about. We do not in this way get to an overdemandingness challenge to consequentialism, thus the restructuring strategy is superfluous (Hurley 2006). Second, it is also argued that the only good rationale for the focus on the overdemanding content of consequentialism presupposes prior and independent breaks with consequentialism, that is, prior to and independent of issues of demandingness. This break concerns the distinction between the costs a moral theory requires the agent to bear and the costs a moral theory permits to befall agents as a result of not requiring others to prevent it. That is, when we are concerned with OD, what we are concerned with is not excessive demands, but something else that our complaints only track, namely the distinction between the two kinds of costs (Sobel 2007). So, again, there is no need to restructure consequentialism in order to respond to OD.

Turn lastly to **the strategy of extremism**. This strategy accepts that consequentialism makes intuitively unacceptable demands, but seeks to undermine or discredit these intuitions (Kagan 1989; Singer 1972; Tännsjö 2002; Unger 1996). Versions of this approach always begin with a strong consequentialist intuition such as that the fact that an outcome is valuable always gives us reason to promote it. Then they try to undermine the opposite intuition by pointing out that it rests on lack of information, lack of clear thinking, lack of imaginative empathy or on some psychological 'failure'. The question is whether our intuition concerning overdemandingness really rests on such cognitive, emotional and other failures of reasoning and even if it does, whether this really matters. If the answer to either of these queries is negative, what we are left with are two, perhaps equally strong intuitions. And then one can just say that what we have here is nothing more but an irresolvable clash of intuitions, the existence of which is hardly enough to save the day for consequentialism (Cullity 1994).

My research aims to break with current trends in discussing OD by focusing on a less investigated aspect of consequentialist demands: their authority. I believe that in our dealings with OD we must direct our attention to the strength of our reasons to meet consequentialist requirements. OD then takes the form of a claim that consequentialism is overdemanding because it requires us, with decisive force, to do things that we do not have decisive reason to perform. I believe that this is the only defensible interpretation of OD and, accordingly, responding to OD will require us to deny this inescapability. I spell out my reasons for this claim, my objectives and methods, as well as the prospected schedule of my research in section 3 of this application. The chosen line of investigation continues my research in the field of reasons for action, as the following description of my research career testifies.

Before turning to philosophy, I have studied Economics, Political Science and Political Theory. Initially I pursued research in social and political philosophy on topics such as political obligation, theories of justice, and theories of democracy.

My doctoral research, however, departed from these topics of political philosophy. In my doctoral dissertation, I argued against the idea - I called it the Desire-Based Reasons Model - that reasons for action are provided by desires. After spelling out three versions of the Model, I went on to attack it from three angles. They concerned the best meta-ethical background for the Model, its account of the relation between reasons and desires, and its appeal to the Humean theory of motivation. During my doctoral studies, I spent a research year at the University of Oxford working under the supervision of Krister Bykvist, and at the University of Oslo, where I worked with Olav Gjelsvik and others. I defended my doctoral thesis in December 2006 at the Social and Political Theory track of the doctoral program in Political Science at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. In 2007 the thesis was accepted as a Ph.D. in Philosophy by Eötvös Lóránd University, Budapest, Hungary. In 2005 my work was recognized with the 'CEU Award for Advanced Doctoral Students'.

Although my dissertation was more theoretical, I have had – and continue to have – abiding interests in normative ethics and political philosophy. In the recent past I have investigated Rawls's Difference Principle, and examined the ideology of the British Third Way focusing on the lessons it might have for Hungarian social democracy. In cooperation with the Hungarian think-tank Demos, I have investigated the justice of health-care distribution in the context of the Hungarian health-care system. More recently, I have pursued research on the Frankfurt School and its relation to the events of 1968.

In the past two years, I was employed as a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University. During my fellowship tenure I have written several papers that examine the Desire-Based Reasons Model. These papers are based on chapters of my dissertation. In addition to papers on the theory of motivation and the normativity of ethical naturalism (Tanyi 2009), in a series of papers I examine the argument that desires cannot provide reasons for action because they only transmit value-based reasons in which they are grounded. My arguments in these papers involve arguing against the desire-based theory of pleasure (Tanyi forthcoming a); defending the idea that desires contain a normative or evaluative element in some primitive form (Tanyi forthcoming d); and arguing against the claim that desires have a normative role in resolving ties in multiple choice situations (Tanyi forthcoming b). I have also written a paper that presents my reasoning for the claim that the best way to approach the Overdemandingness Objection is from the dimension of authority that concerns the reasons the theory provides us with (Tanyi forthcoming c). In addition to this research on reasons, in a paper with Karl Karlander (Stockholm) I argue against Bernard Williams' claim that an immortal existence would necessarily lead to insufferable boredom by appealing to the virtue of curiosity.

In January 2010 I moved to Konstanz, Germany to take up my fellowship in the Zukunftskolleg of the University of Konstanz. My research project, funded by the Zukunftskolleg, starts from the Overdemandingness Objection and focuses on the strength of consequentialist moral reasons. My position in the Zukunftskolleg is based on a 1.5 years contract with optional extension to 5 years; the extension is conditional upon gaining successful third-party funding.

In addition to research work, I have taught courses on diverse topics in political philosophy (theories of democracy, political obligation, political legitimacy, constitutionalism, politics and morality), moral philosophy (theories of justice, moral demands), and meta-ethics (practical reasons, personal identity). At present I teach a graduate course on John Rawls' moral and political philosophy, and in the coming semester I will teach another graduate course on Henry Sidgwick's *The Methods of Ethics*. Some of these courses have involved one-to-one tutorial work with students. I have also done supervisory work in the joint masters program of the International Business School, Budapest and Oxford Brookes University.

2.2. Project-related list of publications.

Tanyi, Attila. (2009). ‘Desire-based Reasons, Naturalism, and Normativity’. *Polish Journal of Philosophy* 3 (2): 87-107.

Tanyi, Attila. (forthcoming a). ‘Reason and Desire: The Role of Pleasure’. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*. Submitted: April 2009. Accepted: December 2009.

Tanyi, Attila. (forthcoming b). ‘Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking’. *Philosophical Studies*. Submitted: April 2009. Accepted: November 2009.

Tanyi, Attila. (forthcoming c). ‘The Case for Authority’. Contracted article, forthcoming in the first volume of the book series *Ethics and Morals* on moral overridingness*,* edited by Sebastian Schleidgen. Contributors include Michael Slote, Owen Flanagan, Sandra Fairbanks, Stephan Schlothfeldt. Marburg, Germany: Tactum.

Tanyi, Attila. (forthcoming d). ‘Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires’. *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy*. Submitted: October 2009. Accepted: June 2010.

3. Objectives and work schedule.

3.1. Objectives.

The aim of the project is to assess the truth of the Overdemandingness Objection (OD). According to its critics, act-consequentialism subsumes the supererogatory (what is not required but admirable) to the right (what is not merely permissible but required), and has no space for mundane actions (what is merely permissible). The objective of the project is to see whether consequentialism indeed fails to leave room for ‘options’ in our pursuit of the good, i.e. whether it indeed fails to allow us sometimes to pursue the less good outcome – for this is just the option that common sense morality seems to give us.

To properly investigate this question, we must first work out the most plausible form of OD. At this point the project builds on an elaboration of the structure of OD by delineating and examining the different dimensions that the notion of overdemandingness encompasses. It distinguishes three such dimensions. The dimension of **scope** refers to the pervasiveness of a moral theory: to the circle of voluntary human action that the theory regards as open to moral assessment. A moral theory is overdemanding in this sense if the circle of actions open to moral assessment is too broad. The dimension of **content** deals with the stringency of a moral theory: with the amount of inconsistency that exists between moral directives and the agent’s non-moral goals, projects and commitments. A moral theory is overdemanding in this sense if it contains requirements that it should not or if it imposes costs on the agent that are unacceptable. Finally, the dimension of **authority** concerns the inescapability of a moral theory: it concerns the weight of our reasons to act morally as compared to the reasons we have to act non-morally. A moral theory is overdemanding in this sense if it holds actions to be inescapable that we do not have decisive reason to perform.

Let us turn now to the assessment of the different readings of OD. The first two dimensions do not give us a demandingness challenge. Reducing the *scope* of consequentialism is not required by common sense morality, it lacks any good rationale, and it is also positively unwarranted for several reasons such as the context-dependence of moral assessment (depending on context, any action, no matter how trivial it is, invites moral assessment). In short, if there is a demandingness problem with consequentialism, this is not derived from its unrestricted scope; in fact, unrestricted scope is a desirable feature of moral theories. At the same time, the *content*-based understanding of OD, though popular, is far from convincing (the restructuring strategy that has been discussed earlier understands OD in this way). In particular, as was also explained in sub-section 2.1, two arguments, by David Sobel (2007) and Paul Hurley (2006), show that focusing on the overdemanding content of consequentialism may cause us to miss our target. A moral requirement may need the backing of reasons in order to make a demand on the agent; and the content-based reading of OD may stem from breaks with consequentialism that are prior to and independent of its demandingness. If either of these arguments succeeds then, just like pervasiveness, stringency will also not give us an overdemandingness challenge.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that those who advocate OD should follow the ***authority*** dimension. Their claim should be that consequentialism is overdemanding because, while being stringent and pervasive, our reasons to meet its requirements override other competing reasons, resulting in situations when it demands us, with decisive force, to do things that we do not have decisive reason to do. If one wants to respond to OD, therefore, one must take this to be the right interpretation of what the Objection states, and deny it in some way. Accordingly, for a project that aims to assess the truth of OD it is imperative to thoroughly examine the reasons we have to follow consequentialism.

The charge that consequentialist requirements are overdemanding because inescapable (while being stringent and pervasive), assumes the truth of the following three claims:

- There are reasons to act morally.
- There are reasons to act as consequentialism requires.
- Consequentialist reasons override other conflicting reasons of the agent.

All three claims can take a weak and a strong form. The strong version of the first claim says that *every* (rational) agent has reason to act morally; the weak version holds that only *some* (albeit, perhaps, most) agents have reason to act morally. OD in its present form is based on the idea that at least in some situations what consequentialism requires us to do is such that we intuitively think that we do not have decisive reason to do it. Situations in which this is the case can come about even if not every rational agent has moral reasons to act. Surely, we are more likely to encounter such cases if all rational agents have moral reasons to act, but this is not needed. Moreover, it is more charitable to advocates of OD to proceed on the assumption that the weak version is enough to support the objection. As to the second claim, although one might endorse the strong form of this claim (our reasons to act morally supports *exclusively* consequentialist courses of action), OD does not need this; it is enough if we have consequentialist reasons, exclusivity is not required (the weak reading of this claim). Finally, the third claim - we can call it the **overridingness thesis** - too has a weak and a strong form depending on whether reasons to act as consequentialism requires *always* win out in the clash of reasons (strong version), or only sometimes, albeit, perhaps, most of the time (weak version). Again and for the same reasons as with the first claim, the weak reading is enough to support OD.

The project argues for the truth of the first and the second claim, but rejects the overridingness thesis. The first part of the project deals with the first claim, the second part with the second claim, the third part with the third claim. In doing so the project builds on the existing contemporary literature on reasons and on consequentialism, although relevant historical works will also be considered. The approach, however, throughout will be analytic. The research will focus on the correctness of these views in answering the questions the project poses, and not on their historical background and development.

The project has practical significance and its results are therefore relevant outside the specialist domains involved. This significance has three sources. **First**, there is much public discussion about the role and importance of moral demands in our life. **Second**, there is also much public discussion about our obligations towards the poor both globally and domestically. In all these debates OD plays an important role, implicitly or explicitly. This is not surprising. In our world, the demands of consequentialism, thus the significance of OD as a response to these demands, is real. Pressing moral questions with clear practical implications arise in both the national and the international arena: answering them makes examination of OD inevitable. To carry out this task in a publicly accessible way is an important methodological aim of the project. The applicant’s position in the Zukunftskolleg at the University of Konstanz is certainly an advantage in this respect, as this institution is primarily aimed at fostering accessibility of high-quality research outside the boundaries of the specialist disciplines. **Finally**, the project, by making use of the principal investigator’s previous academic experience in the form of partnership with other German and European philosophers, and through the organization of two international workshops, provides ample ground for international and national cooperation. This will make the principal investigator, the doctoral member of the project, and the University of Konstanz an even more integral part of the high-level scientific network in the field. This, in turn, will not only further the success of the project, but will also provide ground for possible future cooperation and hence for the continuation of the project in the longer term.

3.2. Work schedule.

The project divides into three parts and will last three years: each year will be spent on researching one part of the project respectively. However, it should be emphasized that the different parts overlap and interact with each other, therefore to separate them in practice is not possible. Related to Part III of the project, there is also a doctoral research scheduled that will span the three-year period of the project. The student is primarily expected to produce original, publishable work in the form of a dissertation, but he/she will also help with the practical parts of the project, especially for what concerns the organization of lectures, seminars, visits and workshops. The student will be employed throughout the three-year period of the research, and funding from the DFG is requested accordingly. As presented here, the student’s research is divided into two stages. However, just as in the case of the principal investigator’s research, these parts overlap and interact, thus their separation in practice cannot be as clear-cut as it is presented in this application.

Outline of work schedule:

3.2.1. Research schedule: principal investigator.

- Part I. Are there reasons to act morally?
- Part II. Are there reasons to act as consequentialism requires?
- Part III. The weight of our consequentialist reasons to act.

3.2.2. Research schedule: doctoral student.

- Part I. Moral rationalism: what it is and what it is not.
- Part II. Moral rationalism: possible defenses.

3.2.3. Time schedule.
- Tables with planned activities.
- Research activities: principal investigator and doctoral student.

3.2.4. The project team and its partners.

3.2.1. Research schedule: principal investigator.

Part I: Are there reasons to act morally?

Consequentialism is a theory of moral standards; in particular, it gives us an account of the relation between moral standards and the evaluation of overall consequences. Unlike other moral theories however, such as Kantian or Hobbesian views, consequentialism is a not a theory of moral standards ***as reasons***: it incorporates no account of reasons for action. Hence it is possible for the consequentialist to avoid OD in the way we understand it now, by refusing to say anything about moral reasons for action. True, this move can be criticized along certain general lines. It can be claimed, recall Paul Hurley's (2006) argument, that moral requirements that are not supported by reasons make no demands on us, and this deprives consequentialism much of its point. It can also be held that reasons determine what we are morally required to do, thus separating moral assessment and moral reasons is not possible. Although these are important claims, and the doctoral student's research will touch upon the latter, the principal investigator's research takes a different direction.

The principal investigator will not consider the possibility of a consequentialist theory that refuses to say anything about the reasons we have to follow its dictates (for an example see Norcross 2006). This move is not only charitable to advocates of OD but is also in line with Hurley's argument since that stresses the importance of reasons for a moral theory. At the same time, although it might be the case that reasons determine the content of moral requirements, when they do, this can have the (intended) effect of limiting those requirements in such a way that they cease to be too demanding. Therefore, out of charity to advocates of OD and to pursue a different way of reconciling reasons and the demands of consequentialism, the project assumes that consequentialism is to be augmented with a theory of practical reasons. The question is which theory this should be and what it will say about consequentialist reasons. In other words, the principal investigator will examine the relation that different accounts of reasons for action have to consequentialism, and see the weight they attach to consequentialist considerations. In the first part of the research theories of reasons will be investigated with particular attention to their views on the existence of moral reasons. The task will be to see if there is a theory of reasons that supports the claim that moral reasons exist for rational agents. The project sets out to show that this question is answered affirmatively.

It matters at this point how one understands the claim about the existence of moral reasons. As pointed out above, the project proceeds on the assumption that the weak version of the claim is enough to support OD. As we saw, this reading requires only that some, albeit perhaps most rational agents have reason to act morally. This claim can easily come out as true on theories of reason. Take the **desire-based** account of practical reason (e.g. Brandt 1979; Williams 1981). On this view reasons are based on the actual desires of the agent in some way: what we have reason to do is what satisfies these desires. This instrumental picture of rationality paired with a teleological account of action fits consequentialism well with its emphasis on producing as much valuable outcome as possible in the world. It is moreover likely that at least some agents possess desires that would be served by acting morally. This result can be reinforced if one can show that the given theory is able to provide for its own support: if it is able to engage with or even generate the relevant desires in the agent. This, of course, requires a properly worked out moral psychology and therefore its outcome is uncertain. However, it should be noted that at the present stage all we need is that people possess desires that can engage with moral requirements. Although these desires may not be particularly strong in everyone, they might nevertheless be widespread enough especially if a suitable institutional context is present. The principal investigator will examine the possibility and details of this idea.

We should also note that there are ways to argue for the strong version of the claim as well. To mention one possibility, one can modify the desire-based account in such a way that moral reasons are accounted for all rational agents. The new theory can focus, for instance, on hypothetical desires and claim that agents would always acquire a desire for the morally right act (Smith 1994). Or it can try to account for the existence of moral reasons by showing that acting morally would satisfy some actual desire of every agent (Schroeder 2007). The principal investigator will investigate both lines of thought.

Finally, if one does not want to get entangled in these debates, one can change focus radically and reject the desire-based account entirely. Those theories of reasons that do this - grouped together under the label '**value-based**' – often advocate the view that all rational agents have reason to act morally (e.g. Dancy 2000; Nagel 1986; Raz 1999; Parfit 2001; Scanlon 1998). Moral values are typically among the values whose existence they affirm and so are the reasons these values ground for agents to act. Coupled with an instrumental theory of rationality and a teleological account of action, moreover, this view too can be made to fit consequentialism.

Part II. Are there reasons to act as consequentialism requires?

However, even if we find that on most theories of reasons, some (or perhaps all) rational agents have reason to act morally, two questions still remain to be answered. In the second part of the research project the principal investigator will turn to the first of these questions: whether moral reasons include consequentialist reasons. The aim again will be to give an affirmative answer.

The primary challenge is the following. Take **value-based** accounts of reasons. These theories of reasons are typically advocated by anti-consequentialist, deontological or perfectionist thinkers. For them moral reasons are often ***agent-relative***: our special obligations towards our loved ones (since they are *our* loved ones) or certain deontological constraints such as the prohibition on murder (since it would be *me* who commits the crime) are prime examples. Consequentialism, on the other hand, claims that moral reasons are ***agent-neutral*** reasons to promote the good: they are reasons that do not make essential reference to the agent who has the reason (*her* happiness, pleasure etc.). The question then becomes whether the set of moral reasons whose existence we have established includes such agent-neutral considerations. It seems, however, that on the value-based account there is a good chance to prove the existence of agent-neutral reasons. For it is fairly uncontroversial that pleasure and pain or the needs and welfare of others ground such reasons. In fact, what appears to be more difficult to prove is that agent-relative moral reasons exist (why does it matter that this is *her* pain and not just pain as such?; cf. Nagel 1986). Although there is more contingency in the case of the **desire-based** account, upon investigation it can turn out that at least some of our desires support consequentialist moral conduct. To mention one idea, sympathy and benevolence, though may not be strong in many or even most people, nevertheless seem to be just the kind of desires that are widespread enough to ground consequentialist reasons, especially in a fitting institutional framework. The principal investigator will investigate this possibility.

There is, however, another complication. It is that consequentialism traditionally does not admit the existence of agent-relative moral reasons unless they can be derived from agent-neutral reasons. There are two ways to proceed in this regard. One is to show that consequentialist moral reasons exhaust the set of moral reasons. One can, for instance, prove that consequentialism can incorporate agent-relative deontological restrictions: that there is such a thing as a consequentialism of rights (cf. Cummiskey 1996; Kamm 1996; Hurley 1997, 2006; Brand-Ballard 2004). Alternatively, one might argue that consequentialism can incorporate the special perspective of spouses and friends, i.e. that it can make room for agent-relative special obligations (cf. Sen 1982, 2002; Broome 1991; Portmore 2001, 2003). Perhaps these or other, yet unknown approaches can provide us with the arguments we need. Alternatively, it could be argued that although there are both consequentialist and (non-derivative) non-consequentialist moral reasons, this is a situation that is consistent with consequentialism. The principal investigator will pursue both these lines of thought.

Part III. The weight of consequentialist moral reasons.

The third part of the project will continue the investigation of theories of reasons by shifting attention to their account of the strength of moral reasons. The aim will be to show that there is no convincing ground for holding the overridingness thesis.

The complications in this regard concern the troubled relationship that theories of reasons have towards claims of overridingness. Thus, on the **desire-based** reasons view, even if one can account for the existence of moral reasons, there is no *a priori* reason to believe that moral reasons would be weightier than non-moral ones. Theories that in one way or another base reasons on desires will in turn measure reasons by the strength of the desire(s) they are grounded in, and this creates the problem just mentioned. Although one can invoke the possibility of a properly worked out and institutionally embedded moral psychology, even a suitable institutional framework may not guarantee that the relevant desires will be strong enough in people (cf. John Rawls' (1971) remarks on stability and consequentialism). True, here too there is room for alteration of the original idea. Weighing, as Mark Schroeder (2007) did recently, can be understood in a more complex way invoking a regressive account that employs lower- and higher-order reasons. But even so it will still be an open question what this new theory of weighing brings with it with regard to the alleged dominance of moral reasons. To mention one possible line of thought, it seems that there are higher-order reasons to place less weight on consequentialist reasons, whereas there are higher-order reasons to place more weight on non-moral reasons. The fact that the agent has already made large sacrifices (or, even, that she has done her fair share) may be a good candidate for the former reason, whereas the fact that most of our non-moral activities are harmless or even useful and important, might be a good candidate for the latter reason.

Nor are **value-based** theories of reasons guaranteed to give a dominant role to consequentialist reasons. There is certainly nothing in the idea of a reason being value-based, as opposed to desire-based, that would necessitate this conclusion. Often, when it is claimed that moral reasons are particularly strong, the basis for this claim is a peculiar understanding of the behavior of moral reasons: moral reasons do not override but silence non-moral reasons – they urge that these reasons are not, in the given context, reasons at all. However, this thesis is typically restricted to a subset of moral reasons, such as reasons of virtue, thereby making it unsuitable for wider, consequentialist purposes. And this restriction is often justified: the silencing behavior of reasons typically goes together with a particular view of moral perception that only virtuous agents possess (John McDowell's (1978, 1979) work offers a good example). Another idea, coming from Bernard Williams (1973b), is the phenomenon of 'practical necessity': when one thinks (and feels) that one has no alternative, but to do that one thing. It is like Luther's famous proclamation: 'Here I stand; I can no others.' However, while this phenomenon probably exists, it refers to a restricted set of cases. Moreover, cases of practical necessity are typically ones involving deep convictions when we would not complain about excessive demands unsupported by reasons. Nor is it clear whether these cases really involve decisive moral reasons or merely register certain psychological propensities. Finally, and in a more positive vain, it could be argued, following Joshua Gert (2004), that reasons, including moral reasons have two-values: one value represents their requiring force, the other their justifying (permitting) force. It could then be claimed that consequentialist reasons, contrary to what OD assumes, have in fact only justifying force and no requiring force.

In the case of the **value-based** account of reasons it is also a problem that the moral reasons these theories advocate are typically not consequentialist, agent-neutral reasons, but deontological restrictions, reasons stemming from special obligations, or virtue-related reasons. But now, in addition to showing that consequentialism can accommodate or explain away these reasons or live with them peacefully, there is the further task of demonstrating that consequentialist agent-neutral reasons are also overriding or silencing agent-relative moral reasons. This is possible either by showing that agent-neutral reasons are all the reasons there are and agent-relative reasons are derivable from them (hence there is no real conflict between these reasons), or by directly arguing for the claim of overridingness while admitting the existence of both types of reasons. As to this latter task, our considered judgments do not seem to support the idea since it is exactly certain agent-relative moral reasons that we take to be overriding. This is then, another challenge advocates of the overridingness thesis must meet. The principal investigator will investigate these and other challenges with the aim of proving the falsity of the overridingness thesis.

3.2.2. Research schedule: doctoral student.

Part I. Moral rationalism: what it is and what it is not.

To become an integral part of the project, the doctoral student should have an interest in all the general aspects of the project, and should complete his/her PhD thesis on a topic relevant to the project. There is one directly relevant issue whose examination goes beyond the limited time span of the principal investigator's research: the position of **moral rationalism**. This position claims that if an agent is morally required to perform an act, then that agent has decisive reason to perform that act. That is, moral rationalism holds that the claim of overridingness *must* be true for moral requirements: requirements that are not decisive, i.e. not inescapable cannot be *moral* requirements. Consequently, if moral rationalism is true and is unaccompanied by any statement concerning the weight of consequentialist reasons, we may be compelled to reject consequentialism as too demanding (why only ‘may’, is explained below). At the same time, if moral rationalism is true but we find out, on grounds of theories of reasons, that the overridingness thesis does not hold for consequentialism, we will be forced to discard consequentialism as a moral theory: consequentialist requirements will turn out *not* to be requirements of morality. Investigation of this position is therefore crucial for the project. Moreover, as the last point shows, investigating moral rationalism fosters direct interaction between the doctoral student and the principal investigator. In fact, at this point of their research, the principal investigator and the doctoral student will work in tandem: both will examine the claim of inescapability, albeit from different angles.

The aim of the student in the first stage of his/her research will be to clarify the notion of moral rationalism. This clarificatory work is needed because moral rationalism can be confused with other positions. The most tempting such mistake is to understand moral rationalism as just another formulation of the overridingness thesis (cf. Stroud 1998). However, from the presentation above it is clear that moral rationalism makes a much stronger claim than does the overridingness thesis. Moral rationalism requires the strong version of the overridingness thesis and it is a claim about what qualifies as a moral theory. One can also understand moral rationalism as the claim that moral reasons are *morally overriding*. However, this claim is different from moral rationalism insofar as moral overridingness is not the same as overridingness *simpliciter* since the latter presupposes the existence of a normative point of view from which all other points of views, including that of morality, can be assessed. The only way to deny this would be to hold the position what we might dub normative relativism: that there is no such point of view, i.e. that there is no such thing as what one ought to do *simpliciter*, not from just one point of view (cf. Copp 1997; Darwall 1990; McLeod 2001; Norcross 2006; Tännsjö 2009). However, this is another substantial position to argue for; besides, if normative relativism is true, moral rationalism is false. The student will examine these and other different possible misunderstandings surrounding the notion of moral rationalism.

Part II. Moral rationalism: possible defenses.

The aim of the student in the second part of his/her research will be to investigate whether moral rationalism is a defensible position. There is some discussion of the view in the literature, but often it is defended on the ground that moral requirements provide us with decisive reason to act upon them (Darwall 2006; Brink 1997; Scanlon 1998). However, as it stands, this is in no way different from the overridingness thesis that the principal investigator deals with in his own research. One could also argue for rationalism on the ground that it is part of common-sense morality. However, to prove this claim empirical research, probing the content of our moral intuitions, would be needed and this goes beyond the scope of the student’s research. Therefore the student will have to look for other possible defenses of moral rationalism. In this application two defenses are presented that the student should examine, but, of course, he/she might find other arguments for moral rationalism in the literature or devise arguments him/herself.

One way to argue for moral rationalism is to claim that moral requirements give us decisive reasons to act because morality is limited in what it can require us to do – and this limitation is put on morality exactly by what we have decisive reason to do (Portmore forthcoming). This idea is based on two claims. One is that what we are morally required to do is determined by what we have reasons to do;

the other is that these reasons are both moral and non-moral: the moral status of an action is determined by both kinds of reasons. To see if this defense of moral rationalism works, the student will have to assess the two claims that support it. Clearly, the first claim reverses the relation between moral status and reasons that we have so far presupposed. Consequentialism, as noted, is a theory of moral assessment and does not include a theory of reasons. Therefore the project's approach to consequentialist reasons is to start from consequentialist requirements and see how strong reasons they provide us with, given different theories of reasons (to paraphrase: requirements first, reasons follow). The present defense of moral rationalism, on the other hand, assumes that reasons, *both* moral and non-moral, *determine* the moral status of acts (to paraphrase: reasons first, requirements follow). As the contrast shows, there is controversy here; the student will aim to resolve this controversy. Perhaps more importantly, the student will also consider the connection moral rationalism, defended in this way, has to OD. For it seems that the (perhaps intended) effect of arguing for moral rationalism in this way is to limit moral requirements to the extent that no demandingness problem follows.

Another attempt to defend moral rationalism is to derive it from certain theses concerning the relation between moral requirements, reasons to act morally, and blameworthiness (Darwall 2006; Skorupski 1999; Portmore forthcoming). The argument is this: (1) If S is morally required to perform *x*, then S would be blameworthy for freely and knowledgably performing ~*x*; (2) S would be blameworthy for freely and knowledgably *~x-ing* only if S does not have sufficient reason to ~*x*; so, (3) if S is morally required to perform *x,* then S does not have sufficient reason to perform ~*x*; (4) if S does not have sufficient reason to perform ~*x*, then S has decisive reason to perform *x*; therefore, (5) if S is morally required to perform *x*, then S has decisive reason to perform *x* – and this is just the position of moral rationalism. Premises (2) and (4) are the controversial steps in this argument – the former because it makes a controversial claim about blameworthiness, the latter because it presupposes a distinction between sufficient and decisive reason, which needs to be argued for - thus the student's focus will be on these two claims with the aim of finding out whether they are defensible or not.

3.2.3. Time schedule.

The tables below summarize the steps planned for the research to be done during the proposed funding period that have been presented in the previous sub-sections in detail (the larger table is also attached to the application as an appendix). The schedule below also contains a preliminary period that precedes the project; it is marked with a dotted cell. This would be spent mainly with the hiring of the doctoral student and with related administrative matters. The table contains the major activities of the project with particular attention to those where funding from the DFG is required.

Tables with planned activities.

Projects	*PhD visit abroad*	*Workshops*	*Senior Fellows*
PI: April 2011-March 2014	January-June 2013	Spring 2013	April 2012-October 2012 (March 2013)
PhD: April 2011-March 2014		Spring 2014	

	2011				2012				2013				2014			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Preliminaries (funding not applied for)	■															
Project part I																
Principal investigator (PI)		■	■	■	■											
Project part II																
PI						■	■	■	■							
Project part III																
PI										■	■	■	■			
Doctoral student (PhD)		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■			
Cooperation																
Senior fellows (6 months)						■	■	■	■							
PhD visit (6 months)									■	■						
Organisation																
Workshop 1									■							
# preparation							■	■	■							
Workshop 2													■			
# preparation											■	■	■			
Publication (peer-reviewed)																
Submissions of…																
PI (3)						■				■			■			
PhD (1)												■				
PI and PhD (1)													■			
Dissertation (PhD)													■			
Conference presentations																
PI (5)			■				■				■					
PhD (3)							■				■					
Summer schools																
PhD (2)							■				■					

Research activities of the principal investigator and the doctoral student.

***Year 1* (April 2011 – March 2012).**

Principal investigator.

In this first year of the project, the principal investigator will work on the first part of the project that aims to prove the existence of moral reasons. In the summer of 2011, the principal investigator will participate in two conferences: the annual conference of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy to be held in July, in Pisa, and the annual conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, to be held in June, also in Pisa. At the same time, the principal investigator will also apply for conferences to take place in the following year, while continuing to work on his original research. There is also an article submission scheduled for the end of this year of the project, that is, in the early summer/late spring of 2012. The article is likely to be written on the different arguments for the existence of moral reasons with special focus on recent desire-based accounts of these reasons.

Doctoral student.

The doctoral student is expected to arrive in Konstanz in the early spring of 2011 and begin to settle in immediately (sorting out administrative issues etc.). Parallel with this, his/her supervision will also begin. The student will be supervised by Prof. Dr. Gottfried Seebaß from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Konstanz and by the principal investigator of the project (see attached letter). Prof. Seebaß is a widely renowned expert in the field of moral philosophy having already supervised several; in addition he is also a member of the DFG-funded excellence cluster ‘The cultural basis of integration’. The two internal supervisors will be joined by Prof. Dr. Christoph Fehige, from the Department of Philosophy at the Saarland University who has agreed to serve as the student’s external supervisor (see attached letter). Prof. Fehige is one of the foremost experts of practical reasons in Germany, thus his support will certainly help the doctoral student in writing his/her dissertation.

The doctoral student will start working on his/her dissertation by drawing up of the schematic plan of the dissertation and preparing a comprehensive literature review on moral rationalism. The internal supervisors will meet the student every second week to discuss written material prepared by the student (in later phrases of the research these meetings will become less frequent). At the same time, under the supervision of the principal investigator the student will set up a plan for his/her participation in the Philosophy Department's research activities (relevant research colloquia).

Year 2 (April 2012 – March 2013).

Principal investigator.

In this second year of the project the principal investigator will focus on the second part of the project that argues for the existence of consequentialist moral reasons. In the summer of 2012, in June and July, the principal investigator will attend two conferences: the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association to be held in July in Stirling, and the annual conference of the Society for Applied Philosophy to be held in June or July. The first workshop, on consequentialism and reasons, that will present the interim results of the project and will provide feedback for the rest of the project, will be held in the spring of 2013. The workshop will be invitational with max. eight participants giving talks in the course of two days. Organizational work on the workshop will however begin, with the invitation of planned participants, administrative matters and the likes, in the winter of 2012.

The project team will also host three senior fellows in the period of April 2012 – September 2012 whose stay will be financed by the Zukunftskolleg at the University of Konstanz; the possibility of their visit to Konstanz will be extended to the period November 2012 – March 2013 provided further funding by the Zukunftskolleg will become available. Dr. Krister Bykvist, from Jesus College, Oxford University, Prof. Dr. Thomas Schmidt from the Department of Philosophy, Humboldt University, and Prof. Dr. Christoph Fehige from the Department of Philosophy, Saarland University have expressed their interest in a stay of up to six months in Konstanz during which time they will cooperate with other researchers of the project. Their ability to come to Konstanz in the proposed period is however conditional on the compatibility of a stay as a senior fellow with organizational matters such as their family situation then (see attached letters). Finally, this year the principal investigator will continue the process of submitting papers to international peer-reviewed journals and will also apply for forthcoming conferences. Expected result of this part of the project is a peer-reviewed article, to be submitted in the early summer of 2013. The article is most likely to be written on the claims that recent theories of reasons make concerning the nature of moral reasons.

Doctoral student.

For the doctoral student this year will begin with his/her participation in international conferences (either those two that the principal investigator will also attend or conferences that are more suitable for the student's research). He/she will also take part in a summer school if a suitable school will be found, one whose profile fits the student's dissertation research (such as the OZSE Summer Seminar in the Netherlands or certain courses of the CEU Summer School in Hungary). Given the close affinity between the topic of these summer courses and that of the project, these occasions will contribute to the success of the project via the increased knowledge of the doctoral student. They will moreover help the doctoral student to enlarge his/her international profile, to meet his/her foreign colleagues, and to get used to audiences outside his/her native environment. For the same reasons the doctoral student will also be given the opportunity to present his/her material in the first workshop of the project in the organization of which he/she will also participate, as his/her time allows.

All these activities will be integrated into the main activity of the student, which is to continue research on his/her dissertation. This research will in this period turn to the possible defenses of moral rationalism (second part of the doctoral student's proposed research), and will be presented in the regular colloquia organized by the department of Philosophy at the University of Konstanz. As part of this process, it is foreseen that the doctoral student will spend the first half of 2013 abroad, at one of the partner institutions of the project, where he/she will pursue his/her doctoral research in cooperation with the host institution.

Year 3 (April 2013 – March 2014).

Principal investigator.

In this third year of the project the principal investigator will end his investigation by examining the strength of consequentialist moral reasons. In the summer of 2013 the principal investigator will attend one conference: the Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference to be held in August, in Boulder, Colorado, USA. Applications for forthcoming conferences will also be submitted, although these will probably take place outside the project period. In addition, a second workshop, on the significance of moral reasons, that closes the project and aims to disseminate its results will be held in the spring of 2014. Unlike the first workshop for which funding from the DFG is applied for, the second workshop will be financed through the co-funding instrument of the Zukunftskolleg (see attached letter and flyer). As before, the workshop will be invitational with eight participants giving talks in the course of two days. The possibility of publishing papers given in the workshop, either as an edited volume or as a special journal issue, will be explored. Organizational work will again begin earlier, already in the winter of 2013. This will involve the usual process of inviting participants, organizing their trip to and stay in Konstanz, and the likes. This time the focus will be on bringing together experts from partner institutions of the project, but renowned 'outside' experts will also be invited. The process of submitting original research to peer-reviewed international journals will also be continued in this final year of the project. The expected result of this part of the project are two peer-reviewed articles, one written jointly with the doctoral student, to be submitted in the Spring of 2014. One article is likely to be written on new theories of weighting reasons, while another article, to be written jointly with the doctoral student, should deal with topics that are related to moral rationalism.

Doctoral student.

The doctoral student will spend the summer of 2013 in part by attending one conference (again, it might be the same as the one the principal investigator will participate in, or one that is more suitable for his/her dissertation project), and by taking part in a summer school (again, only if an appropriate summer school will be found). The main activity of the student will however be his/her dissertation work, which will continue the investigation of the defenses of moral rationalism (second part of the doctoral student's proposed research). This research should come to an end in the early spring of 2014. It is expected that the student will submit in this period the final draft of his/her dissertation. At this point efforts will be made to find a suitable publisher for the dissertation. It is also expected that the student will submit a paper for peer-review to an international journal containing original research that has been carried out as part of his/her dissertation research. Finally, in the winter of 2013 and the spring of 2014, the student will help the principal investigator with the organization of the second project workshop. Again, the student's active participation in the workshop is envisaged.

3.2.4. The project team and its partners.

The project will collaborate with several academics in Germany and abroad. A smaller circle of these scholars, the so-called *project team*, will consist of those people who will actively participate in the running of the project. In addition to the principal investigator and the doctoral student, the proposed first internal supervisor of the doctoral student, Prof. Dr. Gottfried Seebaß, the proposed external supervisor of the doctoral student and proposed senior fellow, Prof. Dr. Cristophe Fehige, and the other proposed senior fellows, Prof. Dr. Thomas Schmidt and Dr. Krister Bykvist will belong to this group.

In addition to the project team, the project will collaborate with several *partners* both in Germany and abroad (see attached letters). These partners will provide practical help: they will host the doctoral student and will be the primary participants in the workshops. In Germany the principal partners will be Prof. Peter Stemmer and Dr. Stephan Schlothfeldt, both from Department of Philosophy at the University of Konstanz and both experts in different areas of moral philosophy. Based on the principal investigator's previous academic experience, the primary international partners will be Prof. Tornbjörn Tännsjö and Dr. Jonas Olson from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Stockholm, and Dr. Kent Hurtig from the Department of Philosophy at Uppsala University and the University of Stirling. All these scholars are renowned experts in ethics and meta-ethics having done significant work in value theory, on theories of reasons as well as on consequentialism.

3.3. Experiments involving humans or human materials.

Not applicable.

3.4. Experiments with animals.

Not applicable.

3.5. Experiments with recombinant DNA.

Not applicable.

3.6. Research subject to the Convention in Biological Diversity (CBD).

Not applicable.

3.7. Data handling.

Not applicable.

4. Funds requested (Beantragte Mittel).

4.1. Staff costs (Personalkosten).

4.1.1. Scientific staff: doctoral student (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter: Doktorand(in)).

The post involves three years of 65% employment starting 01/04/2011 at the wage level TV-L 13.

Die Durchführung des beantragten Forschungsvorhabens erfordert die Anstellung eines Doktoranden / einer Doktorandin auf eine 65% Stelle (TV-L 13) für 3 Jahre, ab dem 01. April 2011.

4.1.2. German language courses (Deutschkurse).

One language course per semester at the University of Konstanz (2*3*50 EUR).

Ein Deutsch-Sprachkurs pro Semester an der Universität Konstanz (2*3*50 EUR).

Total (Gesamt): 300 EUR.

4.2. Scientific instrumentation (Wissenschaftliche Geräte).

Not applicable.

Hier nicht einschlägig.

4.3. Consumables (Verbrauchsmaterial).

Not applicable.

Hier nicht einschlägig.

4.4. Travel (Reisen).

Principal investigator (Projektleiter).

Participation in three conferences (other conferences and workshops will be financed from the principal investigator's research allowance provided by the Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz and through the co-funding scheme of the same institution).

- Travel costs from and back to Konstanz: Annual Conference of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 7), 2011, Pisa, Italy (400); Annual Conference of the Society for Applied Philosophy (SAP), 2012, TBA (400); Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference (RoME), 2013, Boulder, Colorado, USA (800). Total: 1600 EUR.
- Registration costs (3*200). Total: 600 EUR.
- Accommodation costs: ECAP 7, six nights (6*80); SAP, four nights (4*80); RoME, four nights (4*80). Total: 1120 EUR.

Teilnahme an drei Konferenzen (weitere Konferenzen und Workshops werden vom Research allowance, das der Projektleiter vom Zukunftskolleg der Universität Konstanz erhält, und durch Anträge auf Ko-Finanzierung an die gleiche Institution finanziert).

- Reisekosten ab Konstanz, hin und zurück: Annual Conference of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 7), 2011, Pisa, Italy (400); Annual Conference of the Society for Applied Philosophy (SAP), 2012, TBA (400); Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference (RoME), 2013, Boulder, Colorado, USA (800). Gesamt: 1600 EUR.
- Teilnahmegebühren (3*200). Gesamt: 600 EUR.

- Unterkunft: ECAP 7, 6 Nächte (6*80); SAP, 4 Nächte (4*80); RoME, 4 Nächte (4*80). Gesamt: 1120 EUR.

Doctoral student (Doktorand(in)).

Participation in three conferences; two summer schools; visit to partner institution (either Stockholm, Uppsala or Oxford, max. 6 months); visit to the external supervisor, Prof. Dr. Christoph Fehige (six times per year for three years).

- Travel costs from and back to Konstanz. Conferences: ECAP 7 (400); SAP (400); RoME (800); summer schools (2*400); visit to abroad (400); visit to external supervisor (6*3*200). Total: 6400 EUR.
- Registration costs for conferences (3*200), for summer schools (2*200). Total 1000 EUR.
- Accommodation costs in conferences, ECAP 7, six nights (6*80); SAP, four nights (4*80); RoME, four nights (4*80); in summer schools, seven nights each (2*7*80); visit to external supervisor, two nights per occasion (6*3*2*80). Total: 5120 EUR.

Teilnahme an drei Konferenzen; zwei Sommerschulen; Besuch bei der Partnerinstitution (entweder Stockholm, Uppsala oder Oxford, max. 6 Monate); Besuch beim externen Doktorvater, Prof. Dr. Christoph Fehige (6mal pro Jahr für 3 Jahre).

- Reisekosten von Konstanz und zurück. Konferenzen: ECAP 7 (400); SAP (400); RoME (800); Sommerschulen (2*400); Auslandsaufenthalt (400); Besuch beim externen Doktorvater (6*3*200). Gesamt: 6400 EUR.
- Teilnahmegebühren für Konferenzen (3*200), für Sommerschulen (2*200). Gesamt: 1000 EUR.
- Unterkunft bei Konferenzen, ECAP 7, 6 Nachte (6*80); SAP, 4 Nächte (4*80); RoME, 4 Nächte (4*80); bei Sommerschulen, je 7 Nächte (2*7*80); Besuch beim externen Doktorvater, je 2 Nächte (6*3*2*80). Gesamt: 5120 EUR.

Workshop.

Two-day, invitational workshop with max. 8 participants to be held in Konstanz (the second workshop will be financed with funding from the Zukunftskolleg; see attached letter and flyer).

- Travel costs from and back Konstanz: two participants from Germany (2*200); two participants from overseas (2*800); four participants from Europe (4*400). Total: 3600 EUR.
- Accommodation costs, three nights accommodation per participant (8*3*80). Total: 1920 EUR.
- Daily expenses (used to cover lunch, dinner, and refreshments costs), according to the Landesreisekostengesetz, for two days (2*8*24). Total: 384 EUR.
- Complementary support by the University of Konstanz (free of charge): rooms and equipment.

Ein zweitägiger Workshop auf Einladung mit max. 8 Teilnehmern, der in Konstanz stattfinden wird (der zweite Workshop wird aus Mitteln des Zukunftskollegs finanziert).

- Reisekosten ab Konstanz, hin und zurück: 2 Teilnehmer aus Deutschland (2*200); 2 Teilnehmer vom Übersee (2*800); 4 Teilnehmer aus Europa (4*400). Gesamt: 3600 EUR.

- Übernachtung, 3 Nächte Unterkunft pro Teilnehmer (8*3*80). Gesamt: 1920 EUR.
- Tagegeld (Verpflegung), gemäß dem Landesreisekostengesetz, für 2 Tage (2*8*24). Gesamt: 384 EUR.
- Zusätzliche Unterstützung durch die Universität Konstanz (kostenfrei): Räume und Ausstattung

Total (Gesamt): 21744 EUR

4.5. Publication expenses (Publikationkosten).

Publication costs for three years (3*750).

Publikationskosten für drei Jahre (3*750).

Total (Gesamt): 2250 EUR

4.6. Other costs (Sonstige Kosten).

Not applicable.

Hier nicht einschlägig.

4.7. Summary of budget (Kostenübersicht / Aufstellung der Kosten; attached to the application)

Type of costs (Kostenart) (EUR)	**Year 1 (1. Jahr) (April 2011-March 2012)**	**Year 2 (2. Jahr) (April 2012-March 2013)**	**Year 3 (3. Jahr) (April 2013-March 2014)**	**Sum (Gesamt)**
Staff (Personal)				**300**
PhD student (Doktorand (in))	0.65xTV-L13	0.65xTV-L13	0.65xTV-L13	
German course (Deutschkurse)	100	100	100	300
Travel (Reise)				**21744**
Principal Investigator (Projektleiter)				(3320)
↳ *Conferences (Konferenzen)*	1080	920	1320	3320
PhD student (Doktorand(in))				(12520)
↳ *Conferences (Konferenzen)*	1080	920	1320	3320
↳ *Summer schools (Sommerschulen)*		1160	1160	2320
↳ *Visit to external supervisor (Besuch beim externen Doktorvater)*	2160	2160	2160	6480
↳ *Visit to partner institution (Besuch bei der Partnerinstitution)*	----	400	----	400
Workshop	----	5904	----	5904
Publication costs (Publikationskosten)	750	750	750	**2250**
Sum (Gesamt)	**5 170**	**11 914**	**7 210**	**24 294**

5. Prerequisites for carrying out the project.

5.1. Your team.

The following scientific, support and technical staff will be working on the project whose position is not applied for in the current proposal:

- Dr. Attila Tanyi, principal investigator, April 2011 - March 2014, TV-L 14, Stufe 2. At the moment, the envisaged principal investigator has a 1.5 years working contract with optional extension to 5 years in the Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz conditional upon gaining successful third-party funding in the worth of at least 50000 Euros (see attached letter from the Zukunftskolleg).
- Prof. Dr. Gottfried Seebaß, FB Philosophie, University of Konstanz, April 2011 – March 2014. Prof. Seebaß will serve as the first internal supervisor of the doctoral student (the second internal supervisor will be the principal investigator).
- Prof. Dr. Christoph Fehige, FR Philosophie, Saarland University, April 2011 - March 2014. Prof. Fehige will serve as the external supervisor of the doctoral student.
- The following academics are going to be invited to Konstanz by means of the Senior Fellowship tool of the Zukunftskolleg for up to six months in the period of April 2012 – October 2012 (March 2013, if in the meantime further Zukunftskolleg funding becomes available):
    - Prof. Dr. Thomas Schmidt, FB Philosophie, Humboldt University.
    - Dr. Krister Bykvist, Jesus College, Oxford University.
    - Prof. Dr. Christoph Fehige, FR Philosophie, Saarland University.
- Administrative and support staff of the Zukunftskolleg: the project team will be able to make use of the services of the secretaries and technical support staff of the Zukunftskolleg (6 persons altogether).

5.2. Cooperation with other scientists.

Zukunftskolleg of the University of Konstanz.

The Zukunftskolleg is an institute for advanced studies, which was established in the course of the German “Excellence Initiative”. It supports young and promising researchers of all academic fields and fosters interdisciplinary communication. The Zukunftskolleg will provide the research team with offices and basic equipment. The structure of the Zukunftskolleg also provides support for research expenses and other activities (mentorships, invitation of senior fellows, short trips, hiring of student assistants etc.). These have already been considered as complementary to the funds requested in the present application.

Department of Philosophy at the University of Konstanz.

The principal investigator’s regular contact to his professional context is ensured through his affiliation with the Department of Philosophy in Konstanz. The Department has granted its acceptance for the hiring of a doctoral student to work in the project.

Senior Fellowships (see attached letter and flyer).

The Zukunftskolleg at the University of Konstanz offers its fellows to invite established researchers for a period of up to six months in order to assist the fellows in advancing their research. The principal investigator will apply for three fellowships for the following researchers:

- Prof. Dr. Thomas Schmidt, FB Philosophie, Humboldt University.
- Dr. Krister Bykvist, Jesus College, Oxford University.
- Prof. Dr. Christoph Fehige, FR Philosophie, Saarland University.

Co-supervisors of doctoral project.

The principal investigator will closely co-operate with several experts in the supervision of the doctoral project. The proposed supervisory team will consist of the following scholars:

- Prof. Dr. Gottfried Seebaß, first internal supervisor.
- Dr. Attila Tanyi, principal investigator, second internal supervisor.
- Prof. Dr. Christoph Fehige, external supervisor.

Project partners.

In addition to the project team, the project will collaborate with several partners both in Germany and abroad. These partners will provide practical help: they will host the doctoral student and will be the primary participants in the workshops. The following scientists in Konstanz have agreed to cooperate on the project:

- Prof. Dr. Peter Stemmer, FB Philosophie.
- PD Dr. Stephan Schlothfeldt, FB Philosophie.

The following foreign scientists have agreed to cooperate on the project:

- Dr. Jonas Olson, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University.
- Prof. Dr. Tornbjörn Tännsjö, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University.
- Dr. Kent Hurtig, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University; Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling.

5.3. Scientific equipment.

Not applicable.

5.4. Running costs for materials.

The Zukunftskolleg at the University of Konstanz will provide rooms and basic equipment, and will pay for the basic resources and daily costs (e.g. mail, phone, library, teaching materials).

5.5. Conflicts of interest with commercial activities.

Not applicable.

5.6. Other requirements.

Not applicable.

5.7. Services of the University.

The University of Konstanz offers a net of support services to young scientists that is unique in Germany. In particular, the Academic Staff Development Unit will assist the PhD student in his/her personal, interpersonal, and professional development and will advise him/her on his/her career prospects. Other important services include the Welcome Center, the Event management unit, and the Child Care/Dual Career center.

6. Declarations.

6.1. Proposal submitted elsewhere.

I have not requested funding for this project from any other sources. In the event that I submit such a request, I will inform the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft immediately.

6.2. Rules of good scientific practice.

In submitting a proposal for a research grant to the DFG, I agree to adhere to the DFG's rules of good scientific practice.

6.3. Publication list and biography.

In preparing my proposal, I have adhered to the guidelines for publication lists (section I.8) and bibliographies (section II.2).

6.4. Other.

The DFG's liason officer at the University of Konstanz, Prof. Dr. Giovanni Galizia, has been informed about the present application.

7. Signature.

Konstanz*, 21.07.2010* *Dr. Attila Tanyi*

8. List of attachments.

- List of references.
- Detailed scientific curriculum vitae of the applicant, including the five most important publications.
- Copies of the five most important publications.
- Excel table version of the work schedule of the project (section 3.2.4) and Word table version of the summary of costs (section 4.7).
- Letters by Krister Bykvist, Christoph Fehige, Kent Hurtig, Jonas Olson, Stephan Schlothfeldt, Thomas Schmidt, Gottfried Seebaß, Peter Stemmer, Tornbjörn Tännsjö, proposed team members and partners of the project.
- Written statement by the Zukunftskolleg, stating their offer of an extension of the present work contract conditional on the success of the present application.
- Written statement by the Zukunftskolleg, stating the possibility to fund senior fellowships and workshops in the framework of the project (including flyers).
- CD-ROM version of the present application, including electronic versions of those publications mentioned in the publication list but not yet appeared in print.