

# Abstrakter til Research Days ved IFF

Dato: 14.-15. Mai 2025.

Sted: TEO H1 1.417 / Teams (hybrid arrangement)

## Onsdag 14. Mai

09:15-10:00 Sara Toffanin *The lack of relational reciprocity: A critique of the conditioned inclusion of refugees*

10:15-11:00 Fredrik Nilsen *Oppstod feminismen i Mexico? Om Sor Juanas sokratiske forsvar for kvinners rett til å filosofere* (tekstbasert)

I artikkelen presenterer jeg den mexicanske filosofen og forfatteren Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz og diskuterer hvorvidt hennes argumentasjon for kvinners rett til filosofering og utdanning gjør at hun bør innlemmes i feminismens historie og ikke bare, hvilket vanlig er, å karakterisere henne som «protofeminist». Tesen min er at det er vanskelig å innlemme henne i feminismens historie, og dette av to grunner: Hun opererer ikke med et sett av rettigheter som skal tilkomme kvinner i likhet med menn, slik den første bølge av feminister gjorde, og, for det andre, har ikke tenkerne i det ulike bølgene av feminismen bygget på hennes tenkning, slik vi for eksempel ser at feministene i andre, tredje og fjerde bølge bygget videre på den første bølgen. Karakteristikken av Sor Juana som «protofeminist» er således legitim, men hennes tenkning og mot kan og bør så absolutt tjene som motivasjon og inspirasjon for dagens feminister.

11:15-12:00 Jonas Jakobsen *Left Populism as Deliberative Populism: Revisiting the Mouffe-Habermas Debate*

The paper revisits the Mouffe-Habermas debate in the light of ongoing discussions about left-wing populism and its relationship to democracy. I demonstrate that left populism (as defended by Mouffe) and deliberative democracy (in the Habermasian sense) are not opposed for the reasons suggested by Mouffe, i.e., that the latter is consensual and rationalistic while the former is conflictual and passionate. Habermas' approach includes passionate conflict and partisan rhetoric *in addition* to deliberative reason giving in a complex, systemic conception of democracy. On the other hand, scholars inspired by Habermas and deliberative democracy are equally mistaken when arguing that left populism and its claim to speak for “the people” against “the oligarchs” is inherently anti-democratic and anti-deliberative. Drawing on the scholarship on deliberative rhetoric, I argue that populist rhetoric can be plebiscitary or deliberative and thus contribute negatively or positively to truth-seeking and the cultivation of mutual respect in a deliberative system. The interesting question is therefore not whether left populism is inherently democratic (as Mouffe believes) or inherently anti-democratic (as her critics claim), but what the discursive conditions are that make populism conducive (or not) to democracy. I use the seemingly contradictory term “deliberative populism” to conceptualize a form of populism that enhances rather than distorts the epistemic and ethical functions of a deliberative system.

13:00-13:45 Andreas Føllesdal *Tittel TBA*

14:00-14:45 Vegard Stensen *Envy as a ground for redistribution*

When do we have a reason for redistribution *per se* as opposed to an instrumental reason for redistributing, e.g., as a way of making the poor better off? Commonly acknowledged reasons include: when the inequality involves an objectionable status hierarchy; when it undermines social relations; and when it undermines the self-respect of the relatively poor. (e.g., O'Neill 2008; Scanlon 2018). Authors in this debate are generally careful to distinguish their position from an appeal to envy, which is not at all considered a legitimate ground for redistribution. This paper argues, in line with some recent works in social justice theory (e.g., Bankovsky 2018; Walters 2024), for a more positive view on envy. My main contribution is to show that envy is not just a legitimate ground for redistribution in some sense or another. It is also, I argue, distinct in important ways from commonly accepted reasons. I make my case through an examination of John Rawls's theory of justice – justice as fairness – charitably understood. The main claim is twofold. i) a society structured after this conception of justice may give rise to inequalities that are *pro tanto* objectionable because they make a particular kind of envy excusable. ii) The inequalities in question are not obviously objectionable according to other views on when we have a reason for redistribution *per se*.

15:15-16:00 Kerstin Reibold (Teams) *Trusting the Other*

This paper argues that colonialism has produced unjust background circumstances that make it more likely that Western populations distrust immigrants from countries that are perceived as non-Western. It holds that distrust arising from such unjust background circumstances is itself wrongful but also leads to further injustices with regard to integration policies and its associated demands on immigrants. The paper outlines two colonial legacies, cultural racism and global inequality, that create a background context which makes distrust more likely. It then explains why trust is a phenomenon that bears on questions of justice. It argues that mis- or distrust towards an actor cuts this actor off from social capital. If the distrust is wrongful, it thereby produces unjustified disadvantages, undermines effective equality of opportunity, and entrenches structures of dominance. Finally, the paper shows how overlooking the impact of unjust background circumstances on distrust leads to further injustices in the context of integration policies.

16:15-17:00 Attila Tanyi & Michael Morreau (Teams) *Pockets of Harmony: A Solution to the "Profoundest Problem" in Ethics.*

Sidgwick believed that in some choices between alternative courses of action the self-interest of the agent and morality conflict. We propose a new solution to this "profoundest problem" in ethics. There are decision rules for adjudicating in some conflicts between self-interest and morality that in an important sense enjoy the support of both self-interest and morality. Though self-interest and morality really do conflict in choices among different courses of action, we argue,

sometimes they converge when it comes to choices among different ways of resolving these conflicts.

## Torsdag 15. Mai

09:15-10:00 Fredrik Nyseth *Prudence and morality: breaking up is hard to do*

According to *normative pluralism* (as defended by Sagdahl) there are (at least) two standpoints from which we can consider what to do – prudence (i.e. self-interest) and morality – and these are *incommensurable*: When they conflict, there is no rational way to compare them so as to reach a verdict about what we ought to do in some overarching sense. Still, by focusing on where the standpoints overlap, we can define a notion of what we ought to do “all things considered”, and this notion can be used in practical reasoning to provide us with “rationally eligible options”. I explore some difficulties that arise for this position when we consider: i) decisions involving sequences of choices, ii) decisions under risk, and iii) questions about how to individuate choices.

10:15-11:00 Roe Fremstedal *Persons, Values, and Realism*

This paper discusses the value of persons metaethically. It is argued that the value of persons is more fundamental than the value of subjective attitudes and desires. Like pain, desires and attitudes seem to matter by belonging to someone who matters independently as a person. But then the value of persons works as an independent constraint that gives us reason to value desires and attitudes, not vice versa. However, subjectivism seems to get the direction of fit wrong here and suffers from arbitrariness. Thus, realism seems far stronger than subjectivism, particularly regarding the value of persons and desires. Still, intermediary views cannot be dismissed, particularly since some agent-relativity is necessary for justified partiality.

11:15-12:00 Heine Holmen *Toxic Bullshit - How Modern Propaganda, AI, SoMe and Bullshitting Disrupts the Epistemic Functions of Democracy*

13:00-13:45 Beatrix Himmelmann *Nietzsche on the Will to Power*

The doctrine of the will to power is one of Nietzsche’s most intriguing, far-reaching and influential philosophical projects. It remained unfinished, like so many things on which Nietzsche worked. The belief that he bequeathed us an *opus magnum* entitled ‘The Will to Power’ has proven to be false.

Current Nietzsche research tends to focus exclusively on a psychological interpretation of the will to power. By contrast, I would like to show that it is appropriate and worthwhile to consider the doctrine in its full scope and to explore its potential for discussing topical questions in metaphysics, ethics, legal and political philosophy.

14:00-14:45 Maria Danielsen *Developing Nussbaum's Unofficial Account of Emotions*

This article investigates the nature of emotions according to Martha Nussbaum. While Nussbaum insists that emotions are beliefs aimed at distinct values, and thus are cognitive, she also presupposes a bodily source of these values that is distinct from emotions. Accordingly, Nussbaum seems to operate with two different concepts of emotions: one cognitive, which refers to beliefs, and one bodily, which refers to values. This leads to several unresolved aspects of her proposal. For example, Nussbaum does not acknowledge feelings as necessary features of emotions because to her feelings are physical and bodily, whereas beliefs are cognitive. Meanwhile, she explains that emotions render a person vulnerable and reveal our fragility and neediness when faced with our most important values. How can we understand the concepts of vulnerability, fragility, and neediness apart from a bodily context? By discussing Nussbaum's treatment of values, which suggests that a certain type of needs is the foundation of core human values, this article aims to show that Nussbaum's own writings are consistent with the view that emotions are not entirely cognitive, but are also grounded in something physical, namely the body. This view entails that while beliefs are crucial to emotions, emotions are also felt.

15:15-16:00 Bendik Berntsen-Øybø *Tittel TBA*

16:15-17:00 Ivar Labukt *Evolutionary Problems for Ethical Intuitionism*

Ethical intuitionism is the view that human beings have a capacity to grasp non-natural realist ethical truths. I argue that this view is in tension with the evolutionary origin of human ethical thinking. Ethical intuitionists have suggested that the capacity for grasping non-natural realist ethical truths evolved as a byproduct of a more general capacity for rational insight, but I point out that this byproduct explanation relies on questionable assumptions about human thinking. Ethical intuitionists have also claimed that some ethical beliefs have a content that resists evolutionary explanation. I propose an evolutionary explanation that is weak enough to handle these cases, yet strong enough to be incompatible with ethical intuitionism.