DOCTORAL DISSERTATION
2006
An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model, Doctoral dissertation, Central European University, Department of Political Science, Budapest, Hungary.
Abstract. The dissertation argues against the idea that reasons for action are provided by human desires (I call this the Model). After spelling out three versions of the Model, I go on to attack it from three angles. I first argue that the most plausible meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism, but that the naturalist Model cannot vindicate the reduction it proposes and this is unacceptable. After this, I present and defend an approach that questions the idea that the reason-relation must make reference to human desires. The alternative approach argues that desires only transmit reasons on which they are themselves based. Finally, I argue that the right theory of motivation is cognitivist and not Humean in character.
An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model, Doctoral dissertation, Central European University, Department of Political Science, Budapest, Hungary.
Abstract. The dissertation argues against the idea that reasons for action are provided by human desires (I call this the Model). After spelling out three versions of the Model, I go on to attack it from three angles. I first argue that the most plausible meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism, but that the naturalist Model cannot vindicate the reduction it proposes and this is unacceptable. After this, I present and defend an approach that questions the idea that the reason-relation must make reference to human desires. The alternative approach argues that desires only transmit reasons on which they are themselves based. Finally, I argue that the right theory of motivation is cognitivist and not Humean in character.
